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Abstract 
Europe aims at combining income growth with improvements in social cohesion as measured 
by income and health inequalities. We show that, theoretically, both aims can be reconciled 
only under very specific conditions concerning the type of growth and the income 
responsiveness of health. We investigate whether these conditions held in Europe in the 
nineties using panel data from the European Community Household Panel surveys. We use 
pooled interval regressions and inequality decompositions to demonstrate that (i) in all 
countries except Austria, the income elasticity of health is positive and increases with income, 
and (ii) that income growth was not pro-rich in most EU countries, resulting in little or no 
reductions in income inequality and modest increases in income-related health inequality in 
the majority of countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Among the fundamental objectives of the European Union are economic and social progress 
along with improvements in living and working conditions. The EU leaders agreed in Lisbon 
in 2000 ― when setting strategic goals for the current decade ― that the Union should strive 
for economic growth to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy … with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Atkinson et al., 2002). 
The Lisbon European Council not only aimed at stimulating economic growth but also at 
making a decisive impact on the eradication of income poverty and social exclusion and the 
monitoring of progress towards these goals.2 One of the monitoring tools it created was the 
collection of new sets of comparable longitudinal household level data across all member 
states, like the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey, and its successor, the 
EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Social exclusion in the EU is 
broadly defined. It does not only refer to (lack of) income and employment but includes wider 
social dimensions like housing, education and health. A set of indicators has been developed 
for monitoring the degree of inequality in income as well as social indicators like health 
status.
3
 
 
An important question, therefore, is to what extent – and under what conditions – the twin 
goals of income growth and reduction of social inequalities in health are compatible.4 This 
paper focuses on the consequences of income growth, but – as we show further in the paper – 
these cannot be analysed independently from the effects of evolving income inequalities on 
social inequalities in health. A second – no less important – question is which countries have 
managed to achieve these goals, and to what degree. Building on work of Contoyannis and 
Forster (1999a) and Wagstaff et al. (2003) we develop a decomposition technique that points 
to the crucial role of the income elasticity of health. If this elasticity is increasing with 
income, then proportional income growth may – under some conditions – lead to higher 
income-related health inequalities (hereafter denoted as IRHI). If this were the case, then 
                                                
2
 There are 8 Lisbon strategic goals: 6 on economic performance and 2 on increasing social inclusion. 
3
 Among the so-called Level 1 (Laeken) indicators – which consist of a restricted number of lead indicators 
covering the broad fields of social exclusion – are the ratio of equivalised income of the top and bottom quintile 
for income inequality (recommendation 15), and the same ratio for the proportion of the population classifying 
themselves in poor or very poor health (recommendation 23) in Atkinson et al. (2002). 
4
 Note that this paper does not fit into the literature on the role of income growth on poverty reduction (e.g. 
Kraay, 2006) and reduction of income inequality (e.g. Barro, 2000) since we study the joint income-health 
distribution. 
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Europe faces a trade-off between these two goals. If, on the other hand, growth goes hand in 
hand with a reduction in health inequality by income, then greater social inclusion derives as a 
windfall profit. It turns out that the degree to which income growth occurs disproportionately 
at higher or lower incomes, and the degree to which health responds to income changes at 
varying income levels are both crucial elements for the relationship between income growth 
and inequality and the degree of income-related health inequality. 
The paper also analyzes the empirically observed trends in income (inequality) and health 
(inequality) in European countries. We do this by estimating regression models of health and 
by using our decomposition technique to relate trends in income growth and income 
inequality to changes in income-related inequalities in health on the full 8 waves of the 
ECHP. Although we use longitudinal data, our approach is different from Hernández-
Quevedo et al. (2006) who analysed the difference between long-term and short-term IRHI 
using an approach proposed by Jones and Lopez (2004). There is also an epidemiological 
literature on trends in socioeconomic inequalities in self-assessed health (e.g. Dalstra et al, 
2005; Kunst et al, 2005) but in contrast to these earlier empirical papers, we attempt to first 
theoretically identify the role of changes in the level and distribution of incomes on IRHI 
before empirically testing these relationships for a large set of European countries. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains our decomposition technique to analyse 
the consequences of income growth and income inequality upon social inequalities in health. 
Section 3 describes the ECHP data set and the empirical models used to implement our 
decomposition technique of section 2. Empirical results on income elasticities of health and 
on empirical trends in income, health, inequality and our decomposition technique are 
presented in section 4, while section 5 provides a conclusion and discussion. 
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2. Decomposition technique for the relation between the distributions of 
income and health 
 
 
In this section, we present a decomposition technique to examine the impact of changes in the 
income distribution on the distribution of health. We focus on two aspects of the distribution 
of health, i.e. the evolution of average health and of IRHI. Despite the analysis being far more 
complicated for income-related than for pure health inequalities, we did not consider the latter 
since policy makers are generally more concerned with the socioeconomic gradient in health. 
We extend the approach proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003) by allowing for a non-linear 
relationship between income and health. 
 
2.1. Decomposing IRHI in a linear framework 
 
Wagstaff et al. (2003) have proposed a method for decomposing IRHI when health is a linear 
function of a set of determinants. Each individual i  is characterised by her health level 0ih ≥ , 
her income level 0iy ≥  and a vector of other characteristics ix  which could include 
demographics, etc. The linear relationship allows us – without loss of generality – to assume 
that ix  includes only one variable. 
 
(2.1) i i ih y xα β γ= + +  
 
where , ,α β γ  are parameters.5 
 
We are interested in illuminating the role of income growth on the evolution of both mean 
health and IRHI. First, the relation between mean health and mean income is straightforward: 
 
(2.2) H Y Xα β γ= + +  
 
where capital letters denote averages. β  measures the impact of average income on average 
                                                
5 Note that the methodology in this section can cope with an error term by incorporating it in ix , but for ease of 
exposition it is neglected here. 
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health. Consequently, other aspects of the distribution of income (e.g. income inequalities) do 
not matter. 
Like Wagstaff et al. (1991), we will measure IRHI using the concentration index – which is 
widely used to measure relative IRHI (see e.g. Van Doorslaer et al., 1997; Van Doorslaer and 
Koolman, 2004; Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer, 2006). The concentration index ( )i iC h y  
measures the degree of relative inequality and can be written as: 
 
(2.3) ( ) 1
1
2
1
n
i i
i
i i n
i
i
h R
C h y
h
=
=
= −
∑
∑
 
 
where ( )1 0.5iR N i−= −  denotes the fractional rank of income. Wagstaff et al. (2003) have 
shown that a factor decomposition in the spirit of Shorrocks (1982) can be obtained for the 
concentration index.6 Combining equation (2.3) and (2.1) gives: 
 
(2.4) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i
Y X
C h y G y C x y
H H
β γ= +  
 
where ( ) 1Y Hβ −  and ( ) 1X Hγ −  can be interpreted as ‘average elasticities’, ( ) ( )i i iG y C y y=  
is the Gini index, and ( )i iC x y  is the concentration index of ix . Equation (2.4) shows that 
IRHI are a linear function of the income-related inequalities of its determinants weighted by 
their respective ‘average elasticity’. The advantage of their approach for our purposes is that it 
clearly demonstrates that IRHI is related to average income through the income elasticity but 
it highlights that other aspects of the distribution of income also matter, in particular the Gini 
index, the effect of average income on the elasticity of ix  (through the effect onH ) and the 
income rank in ( )i iC x y .7 
 
 
 
                                                
6 See also Clarke et al. (2003) and Gravelle (2003). 
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2.2. Decomposing changes in IRHI in a non-linear equation 
 
While the decomposition presented in the previous section has obvious intuitive appeal, it 
abstracts from the well documented non-linear relationship between income and health, i.e. 
that health shows diminishing returns to income (e.g. Smith, 1999; Deaton, 2003; Ecob and 
Smith, 1999; Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2000; Gravelle and Sutton, 2003; Mackenbach et 
al., 2005). A common approach has been to log-transform 
iy  (e.g. Van Doorslaer and 
Koolman, 2004) or to use a power function of iy  (e.g. Gravelle and Sutton, 2003) in equation 
(2.1) to preserve linearity in the transformed variable and its decomposition in equation (2.4). 
This procedure is incapable of informing on the effect of changes in the Gini and in the 
‘average income elasticity’ as it only informs on the contribution of the elasticity and the Gini 
of the transformed variable (e.g. ( )ln iy ). We propose to resolve this problem by recomputing 
the first term of equation (2.4) in a non-linear setting. We show that it is still possible to make 
(albeit weaker) inferences on the relative importance of the income elasticity versus income 
inequality. 
 
While our basic interest lies in equations (2.2) and (2.4), we are not interested in average 
health and IRHI per se, but rather in their evolution over time. Therefore, we introduce a 
decomposition of (discrete) time-differences in section 2.3 to disentangle the effects of 
proportional income growth and income inequality. Our approach bears some resemblance to 
equation (8) in Wagstaff et al. (2003), which (i) considers a total differential8 and (ii) is 
formulated in a continuous framework, but consequently has the obvious disadvantage that it 
is only an approximation – valid for very small changes – whereas our approach is exact. This 
is important since we intend to analyse large changes in average income. In addition, it is 
easier to deal with non-linearities in our approach (see below). We further assume that 
equation (2.1) holds in each time period. 
 
First, we allow for a non-linear income effect in equation (2.1) by adding a time subscript: 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 Wagstaff et al. (2003) also propose two methods (an Oaxaca-type decomposition and a differential equation 
based decomposition) to decompose changes in IRHI. We come back to the latter in section 2.2. 
8
 Wagstaff et al. (2003) also allow for changes in , ,α β γ . Although we keep β  fixed, the nonlinear relationship 
of ( )f  allows for different income-effects at different income levels, and consequently at different time 
periods. Fixing of α  and γ  is less important since we focus on the impact of the distribution of income on the 
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(2.5) ( );it it ith f y xα β γ= + +  
 
We allow the function ( )f  and its slope to vary with income and will add additional 
restrictions below in order to make some analytic predictions. Taking averages, we obtain: 
 
(2.6) 
( )
1
;
n
it
i
t t
f y
H X
n
β
α γ== + +
∑
 
 
In contrast to equation (2.2), not only average income, but also the non-linearity of the income 
profile now matters due to the aggregation of a non-linear income profile.9 For example, in 
the special case of an increasing and concave second order polynomial, one can show that 
average income increases average health, whereas the variance of income (or income 
inequality) decreases average health. Doing a similar exercise for IRHI, by introducing a non-
linear income profile, changes equation (2.4) in: 
 
(2.7) ( )
( )
( ) ( )1
;
;
n
it
ti
it it it it it it
t t
f y
X
C h y C f y y C x y
nH H
β
β γ== +  
∑
 
 
Note that the introduction of ( )f  removes the exact relationship between ( )it itC h y  and the 
income elasticity and the Gini index. Only if ( );it itf y yβ β= , equation (2.7) reduces to 
equation (2.4). 
 
Second, introducing discrete time differences to equations (2.6) and (2.7) gives: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
distribution of health. Our approach could be generalised to allow for changes in , ,α β γ , but consult section 3.1 
for our reasons not to do so. 
9
 Our assumption does not rely on the literature investigating a direct negative effect of income inequality on 
individual health. Literature surveys (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000b; Deaton, 2003) did not find convincing 
evidence for a direct effect of income inequality on individual health. Moreover, Hildebrand and Van Kerm 
(2005) – who studied the direct effect of income inequality using the ECHP – found a statistically significant, but 
very small negative effect. This would imply that our findings for the effect of income inequality can – in the 
worst case – be interpreted as an upper bound. 
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(2.8) 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1
1 1
; ;
n n
it i
i i
t t
f y f y
H H X X
n
β β
γ= =
−
− = + −
∑ ∑
 
(2.9) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
1
1 11
11
1 1
1
;
;
;
;
n
it
ti
it it it it
t t
it it i i n
i ii
i
i i
f y
X
C f y y C x y
nH H
C h y C h y
X
C x yf y
H
C f y y
nH
β
β γ
γβ
β
=
=
 
           
− = +   
   −
    −    
 
∑
∑
 
 
Equation (2.8) is relatively straightforward, but the effects of proportional income growth (i.e. 
a change in average income) and the change in income inequality on IRHI are not so easily 
inferred from equation (2.9). While it is still straightforward to decompose the effect of a 
change of 
1ix  to itx  on the change in IRHI into an average elasticity and an inequality effect 
using the methods in Wagstaff et al. (2003)), this is no longer the case for a change of 1iy  to 
ity . 
 
2.3. Disentangling proportional income growth from the evolution of income inequality 
 
Our approach consists of the introduction of two hypothetical health levels which allow us to 
put more analytic structure on the decompositions in equation (2.8) and (2.9). These 
hypothetical health levels are pgith  (pg for proportional growth) and 
ng
ith  (ng for no growth), 
i.e. 
 
(2.10) ( );pg pgit it ith f y xα β γ= + +  
(2.11) ( )1;ngit i ith f y xα β γ= + +  
 
where ( ) 11 1pgit i ty y Y Y
−
= . Equation (2.10) presents the hypothetical health level that individual 
i would have had in period t  if her income growth had been equal to the actual average 
growth, but without any changes in income inequality between period t  and 1 . A similar 
intuition lies behind the introduction of ngith , but in contrast to equation (2.10), the income 
distribution remains unchanged. Note that we could also have introduced 1
pg
ih  and 1
ng
ih , but we 
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prefer t  as reference period since it seems more natural to evaluate the effects of income 
changes with the prevailing value of itx .
10 Combining equations (2.8), (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), 
we now obtain: 
 
(2.12) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
; ; ; ;
n n n n
pg pg
it it it i
i i i i
t t
f y f y f y f y
H H X X
n n
β β β β
γ= = = =
− −
− = + + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y−  
(2.13)   
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1
term 1a
1
1 1
1 1 1
 term 1b
; ;
; ;
; ;
; ;
n n
pg
it it
pgi i
it it it ipg
t t
n n
pg
it i
pgi i
it i i ipg ng
t t
f y f y
C f y y C f y y
nH nH
f y f y
C f y y C f y y
nH nH
β β
β β
β β
β β
= =
= =
 =   −   
 + −    
+
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
144444444444424444444444443
144444444444424444444444443
( )
( ) ( )1 1
1 1
1 1
1
term 1c
; ;
;
n n
i i
i i
i i ng
t
f y f y
C f y y
nH nH
β β
β = =
 
 
   − 
 
  
∑ ∑
14444444424444444443
 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
term 2a term 2b
1
1 1 1
1
term 2c
t t t t
it it it i it ipg pg ng
t t t t
t
it i i ing
t
X X X X
C x y C x y C x y
H H H H
X X
C x y C x y
H H
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
 
+ − + − 
 
+ −
144444424444443 144442444443
144444424444443
 
 
where ( ) ( )1pgit iC y C y≡K K . Equation (2.12) clearly shows that the effects of proportional 
income growth and changes in income inequality are easily separated, and are unambiguous: 
average health responds elastically/inelastically/unit elastically if equation (2.5) is 
convex/concave/linear and increasing with income.11 With respect to equation (2.13) things 
are less straightforward. Terms 1a-c disentangle the first term of equation (2.9), while terms 
                                                
10
 Another alternative would be to decompose ( ) ( ), 1 , 1it it i t i tC h y C h y− −− , but it can be shown that the qualitative 
interpretation of the decomposition is similar. We stick to the comparison with period 1  as it allows for more 
variation as we decompose over a longer time period. 
11
 This result was already shown by Contoyannis and Forster (1999a, 1999b). 
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2a-c disentangle the second term of equation (2.9). We will show that the a-terms are related 
to the evolution of income inequality, the b-terms to proportional income growth and the c-
terms to the evolution of the other determinants of health. In the next subsections we discuss 
each term in detail. 
 
2.3.1. Proportional income growth: term 1b and 2b 
The influence of proportional income growth on IRHI is summarised by terms 1b and 2b in 
equation (2.13), i.e. 
 
(2.14) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
1 1 1
; ;
; ;
n n
pg
it i
pgi i
it i i ipg ng
t t
f y f y
C f y y C f y y
nH nH
β β
β β= =  −    
∑ ∑
 
(2.15) ( )1 t tit i pg ng
t t
X X
C x y
H H
γ γ
 
− 
 
 
 
First, note that (2.14) and (2.15) are zero when there is no income growth. Moreover, by 
definition they are not influenced by changes in income inequality, nor by changes in 
itx . 
 
Predictions on the sign of (2.14) can be obtained using a result of Contoyannis and Forster 
(1999a),who considered the special case where income is the sole determinant of health – 
hence (2.14). They show (in their proposition 6) that proportional income growth 
increases/decreases IRHI if the income elasticity is monotonically rising/falling with income. 
The intuition for this result can be grasped by considering the linear version of (2.14), i.e. 
 
(2.16) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1
n n
pg
it i
pgi i
it i i ipg ng
t t
y y
G y y G y y
nH nH
β β
β β= =−
∑ ∑
 
 
which, after some algebra, reduces to 
 
(2.17) 
( )( ) ( )1 1 1
11
2 1
n
t t
i ipg ng
it t
Y Y X
R y
Y nH H
β α γ
=
− +
−  ∑  
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The term before the sum in (2.17) is a constant for given values of tY , 1Y , tX  and positive if 
1tY Y> .12 The first term in the sum ( )12 1−iR  is negative for incomes below the median and 
positive for incomes above the median. Therefore, (2.17) is positive if 1tY Y≥ , which 
establishes the result of Contoyannis and Forster (1999a) for a linear income profile since its 
income elasticity13 always increases with income. 
In case of a non-linear income effect, we can generalize the proposition of Contoyannis and 
Forster (1999a), although the derivation is less intuitive. After some algebra, one can show 
that (2.14) reduces to: 
 
(2.18) ( )
( ) ( )1
1
1
; ;1
2 1
pg
n
it i
i pg ng
i t t
f y f y
R
n H H
β β
=
   
 − − 
    
∑  
 
Taking the partial derivative of the term between square brackets gives14: 
 
(2.19) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
11
1 1
; ;
; ; 1
pg
it i
T
pg ng pg
t t it i
pg pg ng
i it t i t
f y f y Y
H H f y f yY
y y H y H
β β
β β
 
∂ − 
∂  ∂  = −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
 
Multiplying (2.19) by 1Y  again highlights the crucial role of the income elasticity: the 
expression in (2.18) is positive/negative if the income elasticity (evaluated at the average 
values tY  and 1Y ) increases/decreases with income.
15 Because the partial derivatives of 
                                                
12
 It is very plausible to assume that income has a positive effect on health ( 0β > ), that average health at 
income level zero is positive ( 0tXα γ+ > ), and that average health and income are positive 1, , 0
pg ng
t tY H H > . 
13
 Elasticity increases with income since for h y xα β γ= + + , we have that ( ) ( )2 0y y h h yε β β−∂ ∂ = − > . 
14
 Note that we treat the partial derivatives of pg
tH  and 
ng
tH  to 1iy  as zero, which is justified since we only 
intend to investigate how the term changes if we move up in the income distribution, without changing the 
income distribution (in other words, keeping pg
tH  and 
ng
tH  fixed). 
15
 Previous research (e.g. Smith, 1999; Deaton, 2003; Gravelle and Sutton, 2003; Mackenbach et al., 2005) 
generally suggests that the marginal effect of income on health is positive ( )( ); 0f y yβ∂ ∂ >  and declining with 
income ( )( )2 2 0;f yyδ δβ 〈  and this is confirmed in (most of) our empirical exercise. Note that concavity does 
not imply that the income elasticity of health yε  reduces with income. One can see that it is increasing with 
income if ( ) ( )( )( )2 2;y y f y y y hε β∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1; 1 ; 0f y y h f y y y hβ β−  + ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ >  , or 
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( );pgitf y β  and ( )1;if y β  are at the individual level, we can establish a generalization of the 
Contoyannis and Forster (1999a) proof: the income elasticity does not have to 
increase/decrease monotonically. All that is required for (2.18) to be positive/negative is that 
the sum of ( )
( ) ( )1
1
; ;1
2 1
pg
it i
i pg ng
t t
f y f y
R
n H H
β β 
 − −
  
 of incomes above the median is 
larger/smaller than the identical sum of incomes below the median. Loosely speaking, it is 
sufficient if the income elasticity (evaluated at 1iy ) increases/decreases ‘on average’ and not at 
each point of the income profile. 
The combination of the results in (2.12) and (2.19) is powerful. It implies that proportional 
income growth leads to a (welfare improving) average health increase and – depending on the 
slope of the income elasticity – to a (welfare decreasing/increasing) increase/decrease in 
relative income-related health inequality. Because this result has only limit applicability, as it 
only refers to proportional income growth, we abstract from proportional income growth in 
the next section and focus on income inequality changes. 
 
The above discussion illustrates that the income elasticity is a vital element to understand the 
evolution of IRHI. However, (2.14) assumes that only income affects health, whereas 
equation (2.13) allows for an additional determinant itx . It follows – as can be inferred from 
(2.15) – that proportional income growth (through its effect on H ) also affects the elasticity 
of 
itx . Although one can predict that 
pg
tH  is larger/smaller than 
ng
tH  if the elasticity is 
rising/decreasing with income, we cannot predict the sign of (2.15), as we do not know the 
sign of ( )1it i tC x y Xγ  a priori. 
 
2.3.2. Changes in income inequality: term 1a and 2a 
The effect of changes in income inequality on IRHI is summarised by the terms 1a and 2a in 
equation (2.13), i.e. 
 
(2.20) 
( )
( )
( )
( )1 1 1
; ;
; ;
n n
pg
it it
pgi i
it it it ipg
t t
f y f y
C f y y C f y y
nH nH
β β
β β= =    −   
∑ ∑
 
                                                                                                                                                   
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2 2; 1 ;yf y y h f y y y hβ ε β−∂ ∂ − > − ∂ ∂ . Moreover, note that the discussed properties imply that 
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(2.21) ( ) ( )1t tit it it ipg
t t
X X
C x y C x y
H H
γ γ−  
 
We start by noting that both expressions are by definition not influenced by proportional 
income growth, nor by changes in 
itx . The only relevant determinant is the evolution of 
income inequality between period 1 and t . Clearly, without any change in income inequality, 
both terms are zero. 
 
One can derive from (2.20) – which keeps average income fixed – that a change in income 
inequality has an immediate direct effect on IRHI and an effect through the income elasticity. 
Again, we start disentangling (2.20) by first considering when its linear version is positive: 
 
(2.22) 
( )
( )
( )
( )1
1
t
it it t
pg
tiit
t
Y
G y G y H
YG yG y
H
β
β
= ≥ =  
 
Equation (2.22) clearly shows that an increase in income inequality contributes to IRHI. In the 
linear case, the effect through the income elasticity is non-existent as the income elasticity 
does not change due to a change in income inequality. 
Using similar algebra as that used to derive (2.18), we arrive at the corresponding non-linear 
expression, i.e.: 
 
(2.23) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
; ;; ;1
2
pg pgn
it itit it
it i pg pg
i t t t t
f y f yf y f y
R R
n H H H H
β ββ β
=
     
− − −    
        
∑  
 
It can be seen from the R -terms that – in contrast to (2.18) – income inequality also affects 
the fractional rank and thus has a direct effect on (2.20) and that – similar to (2.18) – the 
income elasticity matters. If the evolution of income inequality is on average in favour of/at 
the expense of the rich and if the income elasticity is increasing/decreasing with income, one 
can predict that (2.23) is positive/negative.16 Intuitively, this can be understood from a 
                                                                                                                                                   
1yε < , and thus that the final term between brackets is positive. 
16
 We are grateful to Paul Contoyannis for pointing this out. 
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comparison between (2.18) and (2.23) which shows that in case of pro-rich (pro-poor) 
evolving income inequality and an elasticity that increases (decreases) with income, both 
tendencies reinforce one another. These conditions are sufficient, but not necessary: if these 
tendencies are opposite, then one cannot a priori predict the sign of (2.23).17 Intuitively, the 
latter means that an increase/decrease in income inequality is offset by local changes in the 
income elasticity: which of the two effects dominates is then an empirical question. 
 
It is important to add that (2.21) shows that changes in income inequality have two additional 
effects, i.e. (i) it affects the concentration indices of itx  through differences in the fractional 
rank and (ii) it affects the ‘average elasticity of the 
itx -determinant’ through H . The sign of 
(2.21) cannot be predicted a priori. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the results in this section imply that – contrary to a common 
belief18 (e.g. Blakely and Wilson, 2006; Avendano, Glymour and Mackenbach, 2006; 
Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2006) – reductions in income inequality do not necessarily lead to 
lower IRHI – since there are interactions between the evolution of income inequality and the 
‘slope of the income elasticity’ as soon as income affects health in a non-linear way. 
 
2.3.3. The importance of other determinants: terms 1c and 2c 
Terms c of equation (2.13) measure the effect of the change from 1ix  to itx . Term 1c measures 
the effect of this change through H  while term 2c summarizes the effect of this change on the 
‘average elasticity’ of itx  and the effect that runs via changes in the concentration index of 
itx . 
 
(2.24) ( )
( ) ( )1 1
1 1
1 1
1
; ;
;
n n
i i
i i
i i ng
t
f y f y
C f y y
nH nH
β β
β = =
 
 
   − 
 
  
∑ ∑
 
(2.25) ( ) ( )11 1 1
1
t
it i i ing
t
X X
C x y C x y
H H
γ γ−  
                                                
17
 Contrary to (2.18) where 1iy  and 
pg
ity  are related through 1tY Y , there is no obvious relationship between both 
income terms pg
ity  and ity . 
18 
Contoyannis and Forster (1999a) is a notable exception. 
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Note again that both expressions drop out from equation (2.13) if 
itx  is constant over time. 
However, we cannot predict the sign of (2.24) and (2.25) since the signs of γ  and of 
( )1it iC x y  and ( )1 1i iC x y  are not known a priori. This is not a disadvantage since both 
expressions only enter equation (2.13) to correct the effect of changes in the income 
distribution on IRHI for the evolution of other health determinants. In other words, these are 
just control terms. 
 
In summary, the above approach builds on Wagstaff et al. (2003), but explicitly accounts for a 
non-linear relationship between income and health, and allows for large income changes. 
Depending on the restrictions imposed on the non-linear income profile, predictions can be 
derived on the effects of changes in average income and changes in the variability of 
individual income. For instance, assuming a concave profile, one can predict a positive effect 
from proportional income growth and a negative effect from rising income inequality. The 
picture is more complicated for the effect of changes in the income distribution on the 
evolution of IRHI. In order to disentangle the effect of proportional income growth from the 
impact of changes in income inequality, we introduced two hypothetical health levels, i.e. (i) 
the health level that would prevail in case of a non-changing income distribution and (ii) the 
health level that would prevail in case of proportional income growth. This enabled us to (i) 
isolate the effect of changes in the income distribution from changes in the other health 
determinants, and (ii) to isolate the effect of changes in income inequality from proportional 
income growth. In both instances there is a direct effect of the change in the income 
distribution on IRHI, but also an indirect effect through the other health determinants. 
Building on Contoyannis and Forster (1999a) we showed that the direct effect of proportional 
income growth depends on the slope of the income elasticity. If this elasticity is 
rising/decreasing with income ‘on average’ (see equation (2.18) for the exact condition), IRHI 
increase/decline. With respect to the direct effect of changes in income inequality, we predict 
increasing/decreasing IRHI in case of pro-rich/pro-poor evolving income inequality in 
combination with an income elasticity that increases/decreases with income ‘on average’ (see 
equation (2.23) for the exact condition). We find that reductions in income inequality do not 
always lead to reductions in IRHI if income inequality and the elasticity do not move together 
‘on average’. In the latter case both have an opposite effect and the net effect is an empirical 
issue that cannot be resolved a priori. The sign of the indirect effects (both for proportional 
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income growth and income inequality) could not be inferred since these depend on the 
concentration indices and the elasticity of the other health determinants. Obviously, these are 
not known a priori. 
 
Our empirical analysis has three objectives. First, as introduction, we present estimates of the 
income elasticity of health and how it varies with income. Because the income elasticity and 
its slope are very important to determine the consequences of income growth, we use a 
flexible functional form in the estimation. Secondly, we will examine empirical trends of 
income growth, income inequality, average health and IRHI in Europe in the nineties. Third, 
we will use our decomposition technique to isolate the effects of proportional income growth 
and changing income inequality. 
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3. Data and empirical model specification 
 
 
The data used in this paper are taken from the full 8 annual waves (1994-2001) of the 
European Community Household Panel User Database (ECHP-UDB). The ECHP was 
designed and coordinated by EUROSTAT, and it contains socioeconomic, demographic and 
health variables, for a panel of households which only includes individuals aged 16 or older. 
It used a standardised questionnaire which allows for longitudinal analysis. We use all waves 
that are available for 13 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. We 
did not analyze the data for Luxembourg (small sample) and Sweden (no panel data in 
ECHP). For Germany and the UK, we did not use the ECHP (which only ran from 1994 to 
1997, i.e. waves 1 to 3) but instead used the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) and the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Austria joined the survey in 1995 (wave 2) and 
Finland in 1996 (wave 3). 
 
3.1. Estimating the elasticity of health with respect to income 
 
The two key variables for this study are health and income. The ECHP income measure is 
disposable (i.e. after-tax) household income, which is all net monetary income received by the 
household members during the previous year. It includes income from work (employment and 
self-employment), private income (from investments and property and private transfers to the 
household), pensions and other direct social transfers received. No account has been taken of 
indirect social transfers (e.g. reimbursement of medical expenses), receipts in kind and 
imputed rent from owner-occupied accommodation. The income variable is (i) converted in 
Euros by yearly PPPs (see EUROSTAT, 2003) to allow for comparability across countries, 
and (ii) expressed in constant (1996) prices, i.e. deflated by the harmonised index of consumer 
prices (HICP), to allow for comparability across waves. The HICP is an overall indicator of 
price developments in the Euro area and was taken from the European Central Bank (2000, 
2003).
19
 The income variable was further divided by the OECD modified equivalence scale in 
order to account for household size and composition (giving a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 
0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged 
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under 4 in the household). 
 
Self-assessed health (SAH) is measured as the response to an ordered 5-point scale (ranging 
from very good to very poor) on the question “How is your health in general?” In addition to 
the mere language differences, the question wording was slightly different in 3 of the 13 
countries. For France and Germany, a 6 point, respectively 10 point (health satisfaction) scale 
was recoded into the common 5 point scale by Eurostat. In the UK, the question wording adds 
a reference to people of the same age (except for wave 6) (Hernández-Quevedo et al, 2004). 
Reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed health across cultures and populations is a notable 
concern (Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer (2004) but as our paper is basically about health 
trends within countries this is less of a concern here. We have adopted the scaling methods 
based on interval regression proposed by Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) and used by Van 
Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) on the ECHP data.20 This approach assumes that there is a 
stable mapping from the Health Utility Index (HUI) (see e.g. Feeny et al. 2002) to the (latent) 
variable that determines reported SAH  and that this applies not only to Canadian but also to 
European individuals. While the internal validity of this approach was confirmed in the 
Canadian data (Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003), it is not possible to test the external validity 
on the European data. However, sensitivity analysis using other boundaries has shown that the 
results are almost identical when the imposed thresholds were derived from other (European) 
generic measures like the Euroqol (Lauridsen et al, 2004; Lecluyse and Cleemput, 2005). 
 
While the decomposition technique of section 2 is applicable on any estimate of equation 
(2.5), we would prefer to interpret our estimate of the income effect in this equation as causal, 
as we intend to investigate the impact of proportional income growth and changing income 
inequality on average health and IRHI. One could apply a simultaneous structural estimation 
technique to estimate a Grossman type model (e.g. Wagstaff, 1993), but we have opted for a 
one equation approach because of its transparency, and since we are only interested in the 
overall income effect rather than the underlying pathways. For the estimation of our health 
equation, we have included as covariates – besides income – only demographics like age and 
gender: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
19
 We do not use national CPI’s since yearly PPP’s already eliminate differences in the price evolution between 
countries. All that remains is a correction for ’average price evolution’ in the Euro area, i.e. the HICP. 
20
 Thresholds are 0, 0.428, 0.756, 0.897, 0.947, and 1 
 19 
(3.1) ( )* ';it it itith f xyα γ εβ= + + +  
 
where *
ith  is the latent health outcome, α , β  and γ  are parameters to be estimated, ( );itf y β  
is a non-linear function of income (see below), and ( )2~ 0,it N εε σ . We do not observe *ith , but 
we do observe SAH  and can impose its interval boundaries derived from HUI scores. As a 
result, its predictions are contained in the [0,1] interval and can be interpreted as (predicted) 
health utilities on the HUI scale. The vector of covariates ( itx ) includes age dummies 
(categories: 16-29; 30-44; 45-59; 60-69; 70+) for both sexes. We limit the specification to 
only these covariates on the grounds that these can safely be assumed to be exogenous and 
that we are mainly interested here in an estimate of the overall income elasticity of health 
(utility), not in the effects of endogenous variables (like life style or labour choices) that may 
mediate the effect of income on health. For adults, education would also be an obvious 
exogenous candidate to include and the ECHP records information on the highest level of 
general or higher education completed. Nevertheless, we had to exclude education from our 
regression model as EUROSTAT (2003) notes classification problems related to this variable. 
 
Despite the exogenous covariates and the fact that our income measure refers to disposable 
household income of the previous year – which makes it less prone to reverse causation bias 
compared to contemporary income – , our approach does not necessarily solve the 
endogeneity problem between income and health. Therefore, we have also estimated a 
dynamic version of equation (3.1) which includes SAH  for the previous and the first wave 
(see e.g. Hurd and Kapteyn (2003), Contoyannis et al. (2004) and Jones et al. (2006) for 
similar approaches).21 As the latter specification captures state dependence, removes any 
correlation between income and initial health from the estimate of β , and models income 
effects on health transitions, it is less likely to reflect reverse causation. A comparison of the 
latter estimates with the estimates based on equation (3.1) revealed no major differences 
except for a smaller income effect. The latter finding is obvious given that the dynamic 
approach effectively models health transitions. We also repeated all other analyses in section 
4 (income elasticities, trends of average income, income inequalities, average health, IRHI, 
                                                
21
 Lagged and initial health were included as sets of dummies. 
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and the decomposition approach explained in section 2) and found no important differences.22 
Since the dynamic approach did not alter the qualitative interpretations of our analyses, only 
captures the short run effect of income on health and since the approach based on equation 
(3.1) does not have to deal with terms based on lagged and initial health – and is therefore 
easier to explain – we decided to present the latter.  
 
We have run pooled23 models on a balanced panel of individuals observed for (up to) 8 waves. 
We did not consider unbalanced panels for three reasons. First, although the decomposition 
approach explained in section 2 holds for variable population sizes, it cannot isolate the 
effects of varying population sizes from the effects of changes in the income distribution. 
Second, and more importantly, Jones et al. (2006) have shown that health-related non-
response in the ECHP hardly affects estimates of income effects in health equations, and 
therefore our restriction to balanced panels seems acceptable. Our restriction to balanced 
panels does mean that especially the results on time trends only apply to a cohort of 
individuals. Third, as with the dynamic specification (see footnote 22), we have repeated all 
analyses in section 4 using an unbalanced panel and found no important differences.24 
 
We did not include any time dummies on the grounds that these might pick up some average 
income changes and moreover, in 9 countries the set of time dummies was jointly not 
statistically significant. We have also kept the β ’s fixed across time (see also footnote 8). In 
7 countries we could not reject the null that interactions between time dummies and the non-
linear income profile are statistically irrelevant. Moreover, in those cases where the null was 
rejected, almost none of the individual interactions were statistically significant. Note also 
                                                
22
 There is one difference, i.e. the elasticity estimates are lower for the dynamic approach, but reveal a similar 
pattern. Therefore, we consider it as qualitatively unimportant. Results from the dynamic approach are 
obtainable from the authors. 
23 We also experimented with random effects panel models in which we parameterised the individual effects as a 
function of the means of time-varying variables (Chamberlain, 1980). Although the estimated β ’s were very 
similar to those of the pooled models, we prefer the pooled specifications as they impose less stringent 
exogeneity assumptions (see e.g. chapter 15 in Wooldridge, 200). 
24
 We found two differences in the analyses based on the unbalanced panel, but consider both as unimportant 
since the basic messages of this paper are unaffected. Estimates of the evolution of average health show less of a 
decline and estimates of the trend in IRHI are less increasing. Both findings are not surprising given that we 
study a cohort in the balanced panel, i.e. there is no healthy refreshment sample and no sample drop out from 
unhealthy/deceased individuals and the correlation between income and health is plausibly higher within a 
cohort than across cohorts. We find that the control terms that were explained in section 2.3.3 pick up both 
effects, while the other terms of our decomposition technique are not affected by using the unbalanced panel. 
Also noteworthy is our finding that the estimates of income growth and income inequalities based on an 
unbalanced panel are largely confirmed by those resulting from the balanced panel which suggests that attrition 
is not the driving determinant of these findings. 
 21 
that the non-linear income profile without interactions still allows for differences in the 
income effect across time. The cross-country differences in health, income and demographics 
are documented in Table 3.1 which presents unweighted means of all variables for the pooled 
sample. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics by country 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK
M1629 0,089 0,052 0,059 0,062 0,064 0,069 0,045 0,069 0,096 0,041 0,080 0,077 0,066
M3044 0,141 0,173 0,163 0,147 0,148 0,167 0,126 0,142 0,141 0,167 0,121 0,128 0,146
M4559 0,129 0,120 0,150 0,139 0,132 0,140 0,128 0,143 0,133 0,143 0,118 0,113 0,124
M6069 0,072 0,059 0,062 0,069 0,064 0,068 0,090 0,072 0,070 0,060 0,078 0,078 0,058
M70+ 0,049 0,050 0,047 0,031 0,053 0,032 0,068 0,055 0,046 0,048 0,062 0,067 0,053
F1629 0,076 0,061 0,066 0,075 0,077 0,079 0,069 0,071 0,094 0,058 0,073 0,082 0,078
F3044 0,152 0,203 0,171 0,172 0,170 0,176 0,142 0,157 0,149 0,198 0,136 0,143 0,181
F4559 0,138 0,131 0,162 0,182 0,142 0,140 0,137 0,151 0,137 0,146 0,142 0,131 0,152
F6069 0,080 0,077 0,061 0,072 0,079 0,074 0,099 0,075 0,073 0,075 0,097 0,091 0,065
F70+ 0,074 0,073 0,058 0,051 0,070 0,055 0,096 0,064 0,061 0,064 0,091 0,091 0,077
income 14631 16298 15718 12948 14516 15030 7836 11876 10811 14264 7293 9611 14962
sahverybad 0,013 0,006 0,010 0,006 0,034 0,032 0,021 0,005 0,016 0,005 0,039 0,017 0,019
sahbad 0,058 0,035 0,040 0,054 0,038 0,138 0,074 0,022 0,092 0,037 0,194 0,104 0,076
sahfair 0,216 0,216 0,170 0,309 0,338 0,348 0,185 0,165 0,299 0,232 0,343 0,245 0,223
sahgood 0,429 0,531 0,328 0,461 0,473 0,406 0,270 0,367 0,437 0,561 0,398 0,485 0,466
sahverygood 0,285 0,212 0,451 0,170 0,118 0,076 0,450 0,441 0,157 0,165 0,026 0,150 0,216
N 27769 24200 20352 19314 54688 60160 49072 22976 72288 36448 56776 58456 47400  
 
In view of the literature on a non-linear, concave relationship between income and individual 
health, the discussion on the relevance of equation (2.5) in section 2.2 and the importance of 
non-linearity for the current paper (i.e. rising versus decreasing income elasticity), we allow 
for a flexible functional form by implementing polynomial transformations of income.
25
 This 
allows for the income elasticity of health to decrease with income in some income ranges and 
increase in others. The order of the polynomial was determined by first, estimating each 
model with a fifth order polynomial and then reducing the order of the polynomial until a 
Likelihood Ratio test (1% significance level) rejected the ‘reduced order’ against the higher 
order polynomial. 
 
We did not use the Eurostat-provided cross-sectional individual sampling weights to estimate 
equation (3.1), but we did for the estimation of the elasticity of health with respect to income 
(see e.g. chapter 24 in Cameron and Trivedi (2005)): 
 
(3.2) 
( )ˆ;
ˆ
ˆ
y it it
it it
f y y
y h
β
ε
∂
=
∂
 
                                                
25
 We have not used a power function transformation (e.g. Gravelle and Sutton, 2003) as this would entail a 
maximum likelihood grid search procedure which – in the light of the 13 countries and the interval regression 
technique – would be unduly time intensive. 
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where ^ denotes an estimate and ˆith  is the predicted value of equation (3.1). We computed 
equation (3.2) for each individual and calculate the (weighted) mean to obtain the average 
elasticity over all time periods. In order to verify whether the elasticity is 
increasing/decreasing with income, this procedure was repeated for each income decile for all 
time periods.26 A comparison between the elasticities of the lowest versus highest deciles 
provides an indication of whether equation (2.19) holds. 
 
3.2. Estimating trends of average health, income-related health inequalities, average 
income and income inequality 
 
With respect to the distribution of (predicted) health (utility), we calculate ˆ tH  and ( )ˆit itC h y  
for each t . The concentration index of health ( )ˆit itC h y  is computed using a separate OLS-
regression for each wave t . Kakwani et al. (1997) have shown that the point estimate of ˆtλ  in 
the following equation equals ( )ˆit itC h y . 
 
(3.3) 2
ˆ
ˆˆ2
ˆt
it
R i t i t i it it
t
h
w w w R
H
σ φ λ ζ= + +  
 
where ˆith  is the predicted value of equation (3.1), and thus the resulting ( )ˆit itC h y  can be 
interpreted as income-related inequality in predicted health utility. ˆ tH  is the weighted average 
of ˆith  in wave t , iw  is the sampling weight
27 of individual i  in wave 1, tφ  and tλ  are 
parameters to be estimated, and itζ  is an error term with zero mean. ˆitR  is the estimated 
weighted fractional rank of income in wave t  and ( )
1 22
1 1
ˆˆ 0.5
t
n n
R i i iti i
w w Rσ
−
= =
  = −   ∑ ∑  is 
the estimated weighted variance of ˆitR  in wave t . 
 
                                                
26
 We also calculated elasticities for each decile in each time period since these are more relevant to get 
inferences on equation (2.18). However since the results are confirmed by the elasticities for all time periods and 
since it would overload the paper with additional tables, we decided not to present these results. 
27
 Due to the restriction to a balanced panel we applied the first period weights to all subsequent periods. 
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We estimate two characteristics of the income distribution. First, we calculate the weighted 
average income in each period t . Second, we calculate the Gini index of income in each wave 
t  using equation (3.3) where ˆith  and 
ˆ
tH  have been replaced by respectively ity  and 
ˆ
tY . 
 
All four indicators (average income, average health, income Gini and health concentration 
index) describe the evolution for a single cohort. Especially in the case of average health this 
may differ from the picture that emerges from repeated cross-section samples where births 
and deaths are included. In a cohort, the average health will decline. 
 
3.3. The role of proportional income growth and evolving income inequality 
 
We estimate (weighted) versions of (2.14), (2.15), (2.20), (2.21), (2.24), and (2.25) for each 
country in each wave t , except the first. To compute the terms of our decomposition 
technique, we need estimates of pg
tH  and/or 
ng
tH  which are the weighted averages of 
ˆ pg
ith  and 
ˆng
ith . The latter are obtained by substituting ity  by respectively ˆ
pg
ity  and 1iy  in equation (3.1), 
and calculating the predicted value of health while keeping the coefficients fixed and the other 
variables at their actual value. For ˆ pgith  we need to generate an estimate for ˆ
pg
ity , i.e. 
( )1 1i ty Y Y . The latter estimate allows proportional income growth to differ between each 
period t  and the first period., The sums of (2.14)-(2.15), (2.20)-(2.21) and (2.24)-(2.25) 
provide an indication of the total effect of respectively proportional income growth, income 
inequality, and the other determinants. 
 
3.4. Statistical inference on income elasticity and trends 
 
For statistical inference on the point estimates of the income elasticity at the various deciles, 
the trends in average income, the income Gini, average health, the health CI and its 
decomposition, we use the bootstrap procedure of Mills and Zandvakili (1997). We draw 100 
bootstrap samples28 on the level of the individual (i.e. if an individual is drawn in one time 
period, he is included in all time periods) which corrects the statistical inference for the 
dependence between time periods, repeat all calculations, and compute 95 percent normal 
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confidence intervals for the elasticities and all expressions of the decomposition in section 
2.3. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
28
 We did not consider a higher number of bootstrap replications due to the time-intensity of our bootstrap 
procedure. Nevertheless, we think 100 replications are warranted in our application since we could not reject – at 
the 5% level – the null hypothesis of a normal distribution for 92% of our bootstrap samples. 
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4. Empirical findings 
 
 
We first present results on one of the crucial elements for the evolution of average health and 
income related health inequalities, i.e. the income elasticity of health, then present the trends 
in average health, IRHI, average income and income inequalities and discuss the findings on 
the decomposition approach. Due to space limitations, we present full model estimates of the 
regression model only in Appendix Table 1. The coefficients for the age-gender dummies 
show the expected signs and magnitudes, i.e. younger and male persons have higher health 
than older and female respondents. Income coefficients showed a highly non-linear pattern 
and were (jointly) significant in all specifications and for all countries. 
 
4.1. Income elasticity of health 
 
A summary of the income elasticity estimates (averages over all time periods) is presented in 
Table 4.1 while more details are contained in Appendix Table 2. All elasticities are below one 
– implying a concave income profile – are positive and increasing with income, except for 
Austria where the confidence intervals of all deciles overlap. In all other countries, the point 
estimate of the elasticity starts decreasing only at the highest deciles, but the decline is only 
statistically relevant for Greece and Ireland. 
 
Table 4.1: summary of income elasticity estimates 
Austria Belgium Denmark France Finland Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK
average 0,0268 0,0137 0,0278 0,0301 0,0207 0,0296 0,0211 0,0212 0,0182 0,0152 0,0370 0,0246 0,0283
decile 1 0,0205 0,0065 0,0169 0,0160 0,0130 0,0184 0,0092 0,0160 0,0069 0,0087 0,0156 0,0113 0,0140
decile 2 0,0267 0,0094 0,0222 0,0227 0,0170 0,0260 0,0149 0,0196 0,0121 0,0120 0,0256 0,0177 0,0208
decile 3 0,0285 0,0109 0,0247 0,0260 0,0187 0,0287 0,0183 0,0216 0,0147 0,0132 0,0309 0,0208 0,0242
decile 4 0,0297 0,0123 0,0266 0,0287 0,0201 0,0303 0,0208 0,0233 0,0166 0,0142 0,0350 0,0231 0,0271
decile 5 0,0304 0,0135 0,0283 0,0310 0,0211 0,0317 0,0229 0,0248 0,0185 0,0153 0,0387 0,0254 0,0297
decile 6 0,0306 0,0146 0,0298 0,0331 0,0222 0,0328 0,0249 0,0258 0,0204 0,0163 0,0420 0,0275 0,0319
decile 7 0,0303 0,0158 0,0314 0,0352 0,0233 0,0338 0,0265 0,0259 0,0220 0,0173 0,0453 0,0296 0,0341
decile 8 0,0294 0,0173 0,0331 0,0372 0,0242 0,0342 0,0277 0,0251 0,0236 0,0183 0,0488 0,0315 0,0360
decile 9 0,0268 0,0195 0,0350 0,0390 0,0249 0,0336 0,0279 0,0225 0,0251 0,0191 0,0522 0,0329 0,0376
decile 10 0,0147 0,0173 0,0300 0,0324 0,0220 0,0260 0,0174 0,0077 0,0225 0,0179 0,0362 0,0262 0,0278  
 
In general, we can fairly safely conclude that the income elasticity is positive and non-
decreasing with income over most of the income range. The magnitude of the elasticities is 
rather low; for example, a doubling of income in Austria, results on average in a 2.68 percent 
increase in health. This may be related to the fact that (good) health has an upper bound while 
income is unbounded. Nevertheless, the elasticity differences across deciles are highly 
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relevant. Countries with particularly large differences between higher and lower deciles are 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
While these elasticities only determine the sign of equations (2.18) and (2.23), the findings 
suggest that proportional income growth is likely to lead to an increase in average health and 
IRHI. The decrease – if any – at the highest deciles is not problematic since the elasticities 
above median income are on average much higher than those below the median. The findings 
further indicate that a pro-rich (c.q. pro-poor) change in income inequality has a negative 
(positive) effect on average health and that we only have an unequivocal prediction for the 
evolution of IRHI in the case of a pro-rich evolution of income inequalities. 
 
4.2. Trends in real incomes and income inequality, and trends in average health and 
income related health inequalities 
 
Detailed information (including statistical significance) on the trends in average income, 
income inequality, average health and IRHI for all ECHP countries is presented in the 
appendix in Appendix Table 3-Appendix Table 15. Here we only discuss some summary 
figures. 
 
First of all, it is obvious from Figure 4.1 that income growth has been unequal across 
European countries, and that there have been ups and downs in certain periods, but over the 
entire period (1994-2001), mean incomes have grown in a statistically significant sense in all 
countries in real terms. In percentage terms, mean annual real income growth has been 
particularly strong in Portugal (4%), Spain (3.6%), Ireland (3%), Greece (3%), UK (2.78%) 
and the Netherlands (2%), while it was below 2% in the other countries. Recall from section 
2.3 that with income elasticities of health (increasing with income), the direct predicted effect 
of positive real income growth is to lead to rising IRHI, even if income inequality does not 
rise. 
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of average equivalent real income in 1996 Euros, 13 EU countries, 
1994-2001 
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Second, the Gini trends in Figure 4.2 indicate that very few countries have experienced a 
sustained increase in income inequality over the period 1994-2001. While the trends are by no 
means monotonic, it is clear from the graph and from the tests (reported in Appendix Table 3-
Appendix Table 15) that, on the whole, most countries have experienced either pro-poor 
income growth (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) or income 
inequality has remained fairly stable (Belgium29, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the 
UK).30 The sole exception is Finland which shows a statistically significant positive trend: its 
Gini index was about 10 percent higher in 2001 than in 1996.31 
While these findings may be seen as somewhat surprising in view of the often reported rising 
relative income inequality over this period in the OECD context (see e.g. Smeeding, 2002; 
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005), they are consistent with earlier findings reported by Garcia 
et al. (2004) and Hildebrand and Van Kerm (2005) on the same data and with the series of 
cross sections compared in Atkinson (2003) and Moran (2005). For example, for the same 
                                                
29
 Lefebure (2005) analysed the data for Belgium in isolation and reported a similar trend. 
30
 Because of the non-monotonic trends of income inequality, it is somewhat arbitrary to subdivide the countries 
into two groups. 
31
 The increase in Gini indices is in line with the observed reduction of progressivity of the Finnish tax system 
(see e.g. Jäntti, 2005). We thank Unto Häkkinen for this suggestion. 
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period, also Atkinson (2003) reports stable Gini indices for the Netherlands, Italy and the UK, 
a modest rise in Germany and a strong increase only in Finland. 
Given the estimated income elasticities and the trends in income growth, this implies that we 
cannot make a priori theoretical predictions on the direct effect of income inequality on IRHI, 
except for Finland where income growth is combined with an elasticity that increases with 
income and a pro-rich change in income inequality. For the other countries, we can only apply 
our decomposition technique of section 2.3 to obtain an empirical answer on the role of 
proportional income growth and income inequality. 
 
Figure 4.2: Evolution of the Gini index of income, 13 EU countries, 1994-2001 
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Third, Figure 4.3 describes the trends in average health utility. We have presented the trends 
as relative deviations from 1996 since reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed health might 
invalidate comparisons between countries, but probably not within countries. As expected, 
average health of the ageing cohort decreases but at a slow rate in all countries except the 
UK32 (see also Appendix Table 3-Appendix Table 15). 
 
                                                
32
 It is quite likely that the diverging finding for the UK is influenced by the health assessment ‘compared to 
your own age’ (see also section 3.1). 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of average predicted health utility, 13 EU countries, 1994-2001, 
1996=100 
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Fourth, in Figure 4.4 we focus on the trends of health concentration indices within countries, 
with 1996=100. The positive and increasing CI’s indicate that relative IRHI favoured the rich 
in all countries and increased between 1994 and 2001 in all countries, except Germany and 
the Netherlands. But they have clearly risen much faster in Finland than in any other 
European country in this period. 
 
 30 
Figure 4.4: Trends in health concentration indices, 13 EU countries, 1994-2001, 1996=100 
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In summary, we find that average income has increased in all countries, whereas relative 
income inequality remained stable or decreased in all countries except Finland. While average 
health has deteriorated over time, IRHI has risen more sharply.33 
 
4.3. Mean health and IRHI: the role of income growth and income inequality 
 
Calculation of equation (2.12) was redundant since one can predict a priori the effect of 
income growth and income inequality on mean health trends. Since the income elasticities 
reported in section 4.1 are all between zero and one, the income profile is concave. The 
income elasticities are also increasing over most of the income range. Consequently, average 
predicted health utility will respond inelastically to proportional income growth and 
rising/decreasing income inequalities will have a negative/positive effect on mean health. 
Since all countries (except Finland) experienced stable or decreasing income inequalities, the 
                                                
33
 It is worth mentioning that for a bounded variable (i.e. with potential range [0,1]) the bounds of the 
concentration index are determined by the variable mean: the higher the mean, the lower the bounds of the 
concentration index (see e.g. Wagstaff (2005) and Erreygers (2006)). We used the Wagstaff (2005) 
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combined health effect of income growth and income inequality was positive between 1994 
and 2001. 
 
With respect to the trends in IRHI, the mechanics of our decomposition technique of section 
2.3 are somewhat more complex. We will describe the results for all countries but, due to 
space limitations, we only present the results for the decomposition of the difference between 
the concentration indices of 2001 and 1994 in Table 4.2. Detailed results for all countries are 
available in Appendix Table 3-Appendix Table 15. 
 
Table 4.2: Results of our decomposition technique, 1994-2001 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK
CI1994 0,0092 0,0058 0,0067 0,0057 0,0081 0,0088 0,0140 0,0073 0,0053 0,0041 0,0201 0,0094 0,0091
h1994 0,9042 0,9090 0,9205 0,8909 0,8745 0,8439 0,9092 0,9263 0,8791 0,9056 0,8370 0,8829 0,8860
y1994 14546 15754 14539 11596 14177 15431 6817 10089 10020 13000 7183 8911 13625
G1994 0,2630 0,2908 0,2158 0,2246 0,3335 0,2832 0,3723 0,3168 0,3331 0,2550 0,3669 0,3380 0,3004
CI2001 0,0112 0,0076 0,0103 0,0099 0,0102 0,0091 0,0166 0,0099 0,0076 0,0043 0,0237 0,0127 0,0111
h2001 0,8946 0,9028 0,9145 0,8831 0,8678 0,8294 0,8962 0,9246 0,8646 0,9008 0,8245 0,8752 0,8859
y2001 15711 17118 16313 12660 15889 16819 8426 12509 11534 15081 9527 11483 16652
G2001 0,2487 0,2951 0,2294 0,2495 0,2712 0,2525 0,3337 0,3101 0,2936 0,2399 0,3602 0,3176 0,3014
N 3967 3025 2544 3219 6836 7520 6134 2872 9036 4556 7097 7307 5925
CI2001-CI1994 0,00205 0,00175 0,00358 0,00421 0,00206 0,00029 0,00266 0,00252 0,00228 0,00016 0,00355 0,00330 0,00199
ineq_in -0,00030 -0,00026 0,00042 0,00037 -0,00040 -0,00113 -0,00024 0,00017 -0,00068 -0,00033 -0,00093 -0,00062 -0,00059
elas_in -0,00004 0,00024 0,00031 0,00015 0,00038 0,00015 0,00030 -0,00012 0,00043 0,00026 0,00146 0,00081 0,00075
past_in 0,00010 0,00003 0,00006 0,00005 0,00012 0,00017 0,00015 0,00004 0,00012 0,00003 0,00035 0,00013 0,00005
ineq_ot 0,00258 0,00179 0,00244 0,00362 0,00197 0,00122 0,00214 0,00254 0,00261 0,00039 0,00249 0,00314 0,00168
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00003 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00007 -0,00001 0,00000
past_ot -0,00028 -0,00005 0,00037 0,00002 -0,00001 -0,00012 0,00034 -0,00010 -0,00020 -0,00018 0,00026 -0,00015 0,00011
ineq 0,00228 0,00153 0,00286 0,00399 0,00157 0,00009 0,00190 0,00271 0,00193 0,00006 0,00156 0,00252 0,00109
elas -0,00004 0,00024 0,00030 0,00015 0,00038 0,00014 0,00027 -0,00013 0,00043 0,00026 0,00139 0,00080 0,00074
past -0,00018 -0,00002 0,00043 0,00007 0,00010 0,00005 0,00050 -0,00006 -0,00009 -0,00015 0,00060 -0,00002 0,00016  
Note: CIt= ( )it itC h y ; ht= tH ; yt= tY ; Gt= ( )itG y ; CI2001-CI1994= ( ) ( )2001 2001 1994 1994i i i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: 
equation (2.14); past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all 
ineq_-terms; elas: sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; sum: sum of all terms; shaded: statistically significantly different 
from zero at 5% level. For Austria and Finland, 2001 is compared with 1995 and 1996 respectively. 
 
The term “elas_in” is an estimate of equation (2.14). It measures the direct effect of 
proportional income growth on IRHI, i.e. the effect that runs via the income elasticity. If there 
is positive/negative income growth between period 1  and t , one would expect a 
positive/negative effect on IRHI if the elasticity increases with income. It is found that 
equation (2.14) is positive in all periods and countries where there was positive income 
growth and negative in case of negative income growth, except for Austria, Germany and 
Ireland where the effects are not statistically significant. Overall, these findings imply that 
without proportional income growth, the direct effect would be to find smaller IRHI, except in 
                                                                                                                                                   
normalisation to check whether the ‘predetermined’ relationship causes our finding of increasing health 
inequalities, but we found that it did not. 
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Austria, Germany and Ireland. Therefore, the estimates of equation (2.18) confirm our 
expectations based on the income elasticities in section 4.1 and the positive growth of average 
incomes in all countries in section 4.2. 
 
The second term for which we were able to derive some theoretical predictions is equation 
(2.20), i.e. the direct effect of a change in income inequality. In case of an income elasticity 
increasing with income and pro-rich change in income inequality ‘on average’, one can 
predict that IRHI increases. With opposite configurations of income inequality and the 
elasticity (note that it is the change in elasticity evaluated at pg
ity  and ity  that matters), 
offsetting effects will occur and it is an empirical question which of the two dominates. Only 
for Finland and Denmark (even though the trend in income inequality is not statistically 
significant in Denmark), the theoretically predicted effects are observed, i.e. ineq_in is 
positive and significant when the Gini becomes larger.34 Furthermore, in the majority of 
countries, a decreasing Gini has a negative effect on IRHI, which implies that the direct effect 
of income inequality is more important than the direct offsetting effect through the income 
elasticity (or that IRHI would have been higher without the concurrent change in income 
inequality). For some countries both effects seem to balance out, i.e. Belgium, Greece and 
Ireland. We thus conclude that for the time period considered, income inequality has evolved 
in the same direction as IRHI (although there are some exceptions) and that only in the case of 
Finland (and Denmark) we observe the theoretically predictable effect of increasing health 
inequalities due to the combination of growing income inequality and an elasticity that 
increases with income. In the majority of countries, opposite effects from proportional income 
growth and decreasing income inequalities are observed. 
 
Next, we discuss the term “past_in” which estimates equation (2.24), i.e. the effect of changes 
in the age structure on IRHI (through the effect of health on the income elasticity). This can 
be considered as a ‘control term’ measuring the impact of changes in ‘other variables. It is 
nonetheless of interest here as it measures the ‘direct’ impact of ageing (in a single cohort). 
Obviously the ‘direct’ effect of ageing is to increase IRHI as it increases the income elasticity 
through a reduced mean health. 
                                                
34
 For some countries the Gini also increases in some waves, but without being overall ‘pro-rich’, i.e. the 
changes in the income distribution occur mainly among the rich or among the poor. These countries and waves 
are Austria (wave 6), Belgium (wave 6-8), Italy (wave 2), the Netherlands (wave 2), UK (all waves except 4). 
Also in Ireland we find an increase in the Gini but this is combined with a decreasing elasticity. 
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Next, we discuss the term “elas_ot” (cf. equation (2.15), i.e. the indirect effect of proportional 
income growth on the elasticities of the age-sex structure. The effect runs through the impact 
of income growth on average health which affects these elasticities. We could not derive a 
priori predictions for these terms, but find that they all have a very low contribution (in most 
cases smaller than 0.00000) and are in many cases statistically insignificant. 
 
The term “ineq_ot” (cf. equation (2.21)) summarizes the indirect effect of changing income 
inequality. There is an indirect effect on the elasticities of the age-sex dummies (through 
average health) and an indirect effect through reranking on the concentration indices of the 
same variables. Again, since no theoretical predictions could be derived, this is an empirical 
question. We observe in most cases a positive sign, although the effect is not significant for 
Germany and the Netherlands. Its interpretation is complicated since it is determined by the 
reranking and the effect on the elasticities.35 The effect seems to increase over time, which is 
not surprising as reranking (and the change in elasticities) becomes a more important 
phenomenon when a longer period is considered (see Appendix Table 3-Appendix Table 15 
for more details). 
 
Finally, the term “past_ot” (cf. equation (2.25)) summarizes the effect of changes in the age-
sex dummies on the elasticities (both through the average of the dummies and average health) 
and on the concentration indices of these variables. Again, this term is only of limited interest 
since it enters the decomposition as a “control term”. Recall from the discussion of “in_ot” 
the relevance of this term for issues related to ageing. The term is insignificant for all 
countries, except the Netherlands. 
 
Table 4.2 (and Appendix Table 3-Appendix Table 15), also shows the sum of all ineq, elas 
and past terms. These are interesting since they reflect the sum of the direct and indirect 
effects of respectively income inequality, proportional income growth, and ‘ageing’. In the 
case of opposite indirect and direct effects, they indicate which effects dominate. First, for all 
                                                
35
 Given that the part 
tXγ  is negative in our specification (see Appendix Table 1), this term can only be positive 
if 
( ) ( )1it it it i
pg
t t
C x y C x y
H H
< . If income inequality decreases, one would expect pgtH  to be smaller than tH  (due to 
the positive, but decreasing with income, income profile). It follows that the required inequality always arises if 
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countries, except Denmark, the total effect of 8 years of ageing is insignificant. Although, the 
direct effect of ageing was to increase the income elasticity of health, the combination of 
direct and indirect effects is no longer statistically significant. We may conclude that IRHI is 
hardly influenced by 8 years of ageing in our data. An alternative interpretation is to consider 
the term ‘past’ as a control term that includes age- and sex-related reporting heterogeneity of 
self-assessed health. 
Second, “elas” is in most cases almost identical to elas_in, since the effect of proportional 
income growth on the elasticity of the other variables is (almost) negligible. This means that 
positive income growth adds in all countries, except Austria, Germany and Ireland, to an 
increase in IRHI. This is certainly the most striking finding of our empirical analysis. 
Third, the sign of the total effect of income inequality “ineq” is positive, except for Germany 
and the Netherlands (and Portugal, see Appendix Table 13). This implies that, despite 
decreasing or stable income inequality, the overall effect has been an increase in IRHI. In 
other words, the indirect effects seem to dominate for the effect of income inequality. This 
may not be so surprising given that this term picks up most of the effects of income reranking. 
Note that for the effect of income growth, the direct effect was most important. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
( )it itC x y  is not larger than ( )1it iC x y , i.e. if reranking does not increase income-related inequalities in the 
other determinants, here age and sex. 
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
 
This paper set out to try and answer the question to what extent Europe’s twin goals of 
income growth and reduction of social inequalities – as formulated in the Lisbon strategic 
goals – are compatible, both on theoretical grounds and empirically. In particular, we 
concentrated on the consequences of changes in the income distribution for changes in the 
distribution of health by income. We developed a decomposition technique to analyse the role 
of changes in (proportional) income growth and income inequality on expected trends in 
income-related health inequality. It was then applied to the empirical analysis of these trends 
in 13 European countries using 8 waves of European panel data. 
 
The theoretical model indicates that – when the relationship between income and health is 
concave – proportional income growth increases average health and rising income inequality 
reduces average health. With respect to trends in IRHI, it is more difficult to isolate the role of 
income growth and income inequality. Our solution was to introduce two hypothetical health 
levels. Using this method, we found that income growth and income inequality have a direct 
and indirect effect on IRHI. A priori sign predictions could be obtained for the direct effects, 
but not for the indirect effects. Building on Contoyannis and Forster (1999a), we showed that 
the expected direct effect of proportional income growth depends crucially on the slope of the 
income elasticity. If this elasticity is rising/decreasing with income ‘on average’, IRHI 
increase/decline. With respect to the direct effect of changes in income inequality, we predict 
increasing/decreasing IRHI in case of ‘on average’ pro-rich/pro-poor evolving income 
inequality in combination with an income elasticity that increases/decreases with income ‘on 
average’. The signs of the indirect effects (both for proportional income growth and income 
inequality) could not be inferred from our decomposition technique and are therefore 
empirical questions. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we first examined how estimates of the income elasticity of health 
varied with income since it is an important determinant of the consequences of income growth 
and income inequality. Using a flexible functional form for the estimation, we found that in 
all countries, the marginal effect of income on health is positive and decreasing with income. 
In other words, the income-health relationship is concave, as expected. But secondly, and 
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more importantly, the income elasticity of health was nonetheless found to be rising with 
income (‘on average’). 
 
Second, we presented trends on income growth, income inequality, average health and IRHI. 
While between 1994 and 2001, all European countries were found to have experienced real 
income growth, in most countries this growth was not equally distributed by income level. In 
all EU countries, income growth was found to be either pro-poor or equally distributed, with 
one exception: only Finland experienced a clear pro-rich growth. Given this combination of 
income elasticities rising with income and mostly pro-poor growth, no clear pattern of the 
impact of income inequality upon income-related health inequality could be predicted a 
priori. Only for Finland, a steady rise in the concentration index of health could be 
anticipated. We also presented evidence on the changing distribution of health. Since we 
analysed a cohort of individuals, average health deteriorated over time, while IRHI increased.  
 
Third, in order to clarify the role and quantify the contribution of proportional income growth 
and income inequality in the evolution of average health and IRHI, we used our 
decomposition technique to disentangle direct from indirect effects. We concluded that 
proportional income growth leads to better average health, and this is true a fortiori when 
simultaneously income inequality is falling. So economic growth coupled with reduced 
income inequality is good for mean health levels. However, both the direct and indirect 
effects of proportional income growth were found to increase IRHI. On the other hand, the 
direct effect of falling income inequality in Europe led (with a few exceptions) to lower IRHI, 
while its indirect effect led to increased IRHI. Finally, the model also allows for an analysis of 
the direct and indirect effects of ageing but we found that the 8 years of ageing in our cohort 
added next to nothing to IRHI. 
 
So can the twin goals of economic growth and greater social (health) cohesion in the 
European Union be reconciled? Our analysis suggests that there may be a problem and that 
Wagstaff’s (2002b) hypothesis that developing countries are “swimming against the tide?” by 
trying to couple growth with reducing relative inequalities may similarly apply to high-
income economies like the European. In any case, given the universal observation that 
everywhere in the ‘old’ European Union the income elasticity of health rises with income, 
even proportional growth, leaving income inequality unchanged, will lead to greater IRHI. 
Had European countries not been able to lower or stabilize their income inequality in the 
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nineties, then more countries than only Finland would have experienced sharp increases in 
socio-economic inequalities in health as a result of the economic growth. Obviously, the 
overall welfare implications of improved mean health coupled with rising relative IRHI 
depend on the relative weight given to improvements in the mean versus the distribution. This 
trade-off can be made explicit by using social welfare type functions (cf Wagstaff, 2002a) but 
the results depend crucially on the prevailing degree and type of societal aversion to health 
inequality. Little is known on this empirically and more evidence is needed before these 
measures can be applied for a welfare analysis of health trends. 
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Appendix Table 1: health equation estimates 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Ireland Netherlands Portugal Spain UK
M3044 -0.018** -0.011** -0.016** -0.019** -0.018** -0.030** -0.009** -0.023** -0.010** -0.012** -0.022** -0.018** -0.013**
M4559 -0.060** -0.027** -0.037** -0.063** -0.046** -0.079** -0.038** -0.055** -0.026** -0.027** -0.067** -0.047** -0.027**
M6069 -0.078** -0.040** -0.052** -0.087** -0.069** -0.103** -0.087** -0.090** -0.045** -0.044** -0.120** -0.087** -0.041**
M70+ -0.109** -0.061** -0.076** -0.098** -0.093** -0.125** -0.136** -0.144** -0.053** -0.051** -0.163** -0.100** -0.039**
F1629 -0,002 -0,004 -0.007* -0.007* -0,002 -0.008* 0.005* -0.003+ -0,001 -0.008* 0.001 -0,001 -0.011**
F3044 -0.017** -0.019** -0.023** -0.022** -0.025** -0.035** -0.012** -0.030** -0.011** -0.021** -0.032** -0.020** -0.019**
F4559 -0.057** -0.038** -0.055** -0.061** -0.056** -0.090** -0.051** -0.071** -0.021** -0.038** -0.095** -0.065** -0.041**
F6069 -0.089** -0.052** -0.062** -0.080** -0.079** -0.112** -0.109** -0.116** -0.037** -0.053** -0.156** -0.114** -0.032**
F70+ -0.127** -0.070** -0.092** -0.120** -0.105** -0.148** -0.151** -0.170** -0.057** -0.070** -0.196** -0.134** -0.058**
(eqinc/10000) 0.042** 0.011** 0.025** 0.027** 0.031** 0.032** 0.050** 0.024** 0.047** 0.016** 0.069** 0.040** 0.030**
(eqinc/10000)^2 -0.010** -0.001** -0.002** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.014** -0.003** -0.014** -0.002** -0.015** -0.008** -0.004**
(eqinc/10000)^3 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.002** 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000**
(eqinc/10000)^4 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(eqinc/10000)^5 0.000**
constant 0.907** 0.920** 0.92** 0.913** 0.880** 0.870** 0.929** 0.911** 0.914** 0.914** 0.861** 0.902** 0.879**
0.079** 0.064** 0.078** 0.068** 0.105** 0.114** 0.094** 0.086** 0.060** 0.063** 0.114** 0.090** 0.098**
Observations 27769 24200 20352 19314 54688 60160 49072 72288 22976 36448 56776 58456 47400
2
εσ
 
Notes: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix Table 3: detailed information for Austria 
wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0092 0,0093 0,0096 0,0099 0,0103 0,0106 0,0112 CI wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9042 0,9032 0,9005 0,8987 0,8978 0,8973 0,8946 wave3 0,0001
y 14546 14813 14247 14129 15480 16173 15711 wave4 0,0004 0,0003
G 0,2630 0,2492 0,2473 0,2418 0,2664 0,2468 0,2487 wave5 0,0007 0,0006 0,0003
N 3967 3967 3967 3967 3967 3967 3967 wave6 0,0011 0,0010 0,0006 0,0004
CIt-CI1 0,00011 0,00044 0,00070 0,00109 0,00141 0,00205 wave7 0,0014 0,0013 0,0010 0,0007 0,0003
ineq_in -0,00029 -0,00032 -0,00036 -0,00013 -0,00034 -0,00030 wave8 0,0020 0,0019 0,0016 0,0014 0,0010 0,0006
elas_in 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00003 -0,00007 -0,00004 h
past_in 0,00001 0,00003 0,00004 0,00006 0,00008 0,00010 wave3 -0,0010
ineq_ot 0,00050 0,00088 0,00103 0,00132 0,00194 0,00258 wave4 -0,0037 -0,0027
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00001 0,00000 wave5 -0,0056 -0,0045 -0,0018
past_ot -0,00010 -0,00015 -0,00002 -0,00013 -0,00020 -0,00028 wave6 -0,0064 -0,0054 -0,0027 -0,0008
ineq 0,00021 0,00056 0,00067 0,00119 0,00160 0,00228 wave7 -0,0069 -0,0059 -0,0032 -0,0013 -0,0005
elas -0,00001 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00003 -0,00008 -0,00004 wave8 -0,0097 -0,0087 -0,0060 -0,0041 -0,0033 -0,0028
past -0,00009 -0,00012 0,00002 -0,00007 -0,00012 -0,00018 y
wave3 267
wave4 -299 -566
wave5 -417 -684 -118
wave6 934 667 1233 1351
wave7 1627 1361 1927 2045 693
wave8 1165 899 1464 1583 231 -462
G
wave3 -0,0137
wave4 -0,0157 -0,0019
wave5 -0,0211 -0,0074 -0,0055
wave6 0,0034 0,0171 0,0191 0,0245
wave7 -0,0161 -0,0024 -0,0005 0,0050 -0,0195
wave8 -0,0143 -0,0005 0,0014 0,0069 -0,0176 0,0019  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 4: detailed information for Belgium 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0058 0,0059 0,0060 0,0066 0,0065 0,0071 0,0073 0,0076 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9090 0,9075 0,9069 0,9063 0,9054 0,9043 0,9035 0,9028 wave2 0,0001
y 15754 14909 15510 15728 15865 16437 17074 17118 wave3 0,0002 0,0002
G 0,2908 0,2749 0,2707 0,2687 0,2697 0,3073 0,3178 0,2951 wave4 0,0008 0,0007 0,0006
N 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 3025 wave5 0,0007 0,0006 0,0004 -0,0001
CIt-CI1 0,00006 0,00021 0,00080 0,00066 0,00129 0,00145 0,00175 wave6 0,0013 0,0012 0,0011 0,0005 0,0006
ineq_in -0,00007 -0,00029 -0,00008 -0,00013 -0,00012 -0,00033 -0,00026 wave7 0,0015 0,0014 0,0012 0,0007 0,0008 0,0002
elas_in -0,00015 -0,00004 0,00000 0,00002 0,00012 0,00023 0,00024 wave8 0,0018 0,0017 0,0015 0,0010 0,0011 0,0005 0,0003
past_in 0,00000 0,00001 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 0,00003 0,00003 h
ineq_ot 0,00029 0,00062 0,00099 0,00089 0,00136 0,00165 0,00179 wave2 -0,0016
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0021 -0,0006
past_ot -0,00002 -0,00007 -0,00012 -0,00013 -0,00008 -0,00012 -0,00005 wave4 -0,0027 -0,0012 -0,0006
ineq 0,00022 0,00032 0,00091 0,00075 0,00124 0,00132 0,00153 wave5 -0,0036 -0,0020 -0,0015 -0,0009
elas -0,00015 -0,00004 0,00000 0,00002 0,00012 0,00023 0,00024 wave6 -0,0047 -0,0032 -0,0026 -0,0020 -0,0011
past -0,00002 -0,00006 -0,00010 -0,00011 -0,00006 -0,00010 -0,00002 wave7 -0,0055 -0,0040 -0,0034 -0,0028 -0,0019 -0,0008
wave8 -0,0062 -0,0046 -0,0040 -0,0035 -0,0026 -0,0015 -0,0007
y
wave2 -845
wave3 -244 601
wave4 -25 819 218
wave5 111 956 355 137
wave6 683 1528 926 708 571
wave7 1320 2165 1564 1346 1209 637
wave8 1364 2209 1608 1390 1253 681 44
G
wave2 -0,0159
wave3 -0,0201 -0,0042
wave4 -0,0222 -0,0063 -0,0020
wave5 -0,0212 -0,0053 -0,0010 0,0010
wave6 0,0164 0,0323 0,0366 0,0386 0,0376
wave7 0,0270 0,0429 0,0471 0,0492 0,0482 0,0106
wave8 0,0043 0,0202 0,0244 0,0264 0,0254 -0,0122 -0,0227  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 5: detailed information for Denmark 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0067 0,0075 0,0079 0,0084 0,0087 0,0091 0,0093 0,0103 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9205 0,9192 0,9189 0,9179 0,9177 0,9176 0,9164 0,9145 wave2 0,0007
y 14539 14679 15307 15297 15930 16627 16675 16313 wave3 0,0012 0,0004
G 0,2158 0,2253 0,2228 0,2182 0,2222 0,2251 0,2247 0,2294 wave4 0,0016 0,0009 0,0005
N 2544 2544 2544 2544 2544 2544 2544 2544 wave5 0,0019 0,0012 0,0008 0,0003
CIt-CI1 0,00074 0,00116 0,00164 0,00195 0,00238 0,00260 0,00358 wave6 0,0024 0,0016 0,0012 0,0007 0,0004
ineq_in 0,00005 0,00010 0,00011 0,00028 0,00035 0,00025 0,00042 wave7 0,0026 0,0019 0,0014 0,0010 0,0007 0,0002
elas_in 0,00003 0,00014 0,00014 0,00025 0,00035 0,00036 0,00031 wave8 0,0036 0,0028 0,0024 0,0019 0,0016 0,0012 0,0010
past_in 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 0,00003 0,00004 0,00005 0,00006 h
ineq_ot 0,00060 0,00081 0,00126 0,00131 0,00146 0,00171 0,00244 wave2 -0,0014
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0017 -0,0003
past_ot 0,00005 0,00009 0,00011 0,00008 0,00018 0,00025 0,00037 wave4 -0,0027 -0,0013 -0,0010
ineq 0,00065 0,000914 0,001364 0,001594 0,001812 0,001958 0,002855 wave5 -0,0028 -0,0015 -0,0012 -0,0002
elas 0,00003 0,000141 0,000139 0,000244 0,000347 0,000354 0,000302 wave6 -0,0029 -0,0015 -0,0012 -0,0002 -0,0001
past 0,00006 0,000105 0,000136 0,000109 0,000223 0,000294 0,000426 wave7 -0,0042 -0,0028 -0,0025 -0,0015 -0,0013 -0,0013
wave8 -0,0060 -0,0047 -0,0044 -0,0033 -0,0032 -0,0031 -0,0019
y
wave2 139
wave3 768 629
wave4 758 619 -10
wave5 1391 1252 623 633
wave6 2088 1949 1320 1330 697
wave7 2136 1997 1368 1378 745 48
wave8 1774 1635 1006 1016 383 -314 -362
G
wave2 0,0095
wave3 0,0070 -0,0026
wave4 0,0024 -0,0072 -0,0046
wave5 0,0064 -0,0031 -0,0006 0,0040
wave6 0,0093 -0,0003 0,0023 0,0069 0,0029
wave7 0,0089 -0,0006 0,0020 0,0066 0,0025 -0,0003
wave8 0,0136 0,0040 0,0066 0,0112 0,0072 0,0043 0,0046  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 6: detailed information for Finland 
wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0057 0,0061 0,0072 0,0080 0,0090 0,0099 CI wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8909 0,8889 0,8872 0,8853 0,8847 0,8831 wave4 0,0004
y 11596 11433 11685 11839 12444 12660 wave5 0,0015 0,0011
G 0,2246 0,2289 0,2393 0,2467 0,2445 0,2495 wave6 0,0022 0,0019 0,0008
N 3219 3219 3219 3219 3219 3219 wave7 0,0032 0,0029 0,0018 0,0010
CIt-CI1 0,00035 0,00145 0,00224 0,00322 0,00421 wave8 0,0042 0,0039 0,0028 0,0020 0,0010
ineq_in 0,00012 0,00029 0,00035 0,00032 0,00037 h
elas_in -0,00003 0,00001 0,00004 0,00012 0,00015 wave4 -0,00198
past_in 0,00001 0,00002 0,00003 0,00004 0,00005 wave5 -0,00368 -0,0017
ineq_ot 0,00028 0,00107 0,00154 0,00246 0,00362 wave6 -0,00558 -0,0036 -0,0019
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave7 -0,00619 -0,00422 -0,00251 -0,00061
past_ot -0,00003 0,00006 0,00028 0,00028 0,00002 wave8 -0,00778 -0,0058 -0,0041 -0,0022 -0,00158
ineq 0,00040 0,00136 0,00190 0,00278 0,00399 y
elas -0,00003 0,00001 0,00004 0,00012 0,00015 wave4 -163
past -0,00002 0,00008 0,00031 0,00032 0,00007 wave5 89 252
wave6 243 406 154
wave7 848 1.011 759 605
wave8 1.064 1.226 974 820 216
G
wave4 0,0043
wave5 0,0147 0,0104
wave6 0,0221 0,0178 0,0074
wave7 0,0200 0,0157 0,0053 -0,0021
wave8 0,0249 0,0206 0,0102 0,0028 0,0049  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 7: detailed information for France 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0081 0,0082 0,0083 0,0086 0,0087 0,0089 0,0094 0,0102 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8745 0,8736 0,8719 0,8714 0,8703 0,8689 0,8680 0,8678 wave2 0,0000
y 14177 13902 13872 14442 14749 15061 15300 15889 wave3 0,0002 0,0002
G 0,3335 0,2896 0,2811 0,2815 0,2783 0,2874 0,2809 0,2712 wave4 0,0005 0,0005 0,0003
N 6836 6836 6836 6836 6836 6836 6836 6836 wave5 0,0005 0,0005 0,0003 0,0001
CIt-CI1 0,00001 0,00019 0,00047 0,00052 0,00072 0,00123 0,00206 wave6 0,0007 0,0007 0,0005 0,0002 0,0002
ineq_in -0,00010 -0,00028 -0,00017 -0,00023 -0,00035 -0,00025 -0,00040 wave7 0,0012 0,0012 0,0010 0,0008 0,0007 0,0005
elas_in -0,00007 -0,00008 0,00006 0,00014 0,00021 0,00026 0,00038 wave8 0,0021 0,0020 0,0019 0,0016 0,0015 0,0013 0,0008
past_in 0,00002 0,00004 0,00005 0,00007 0,00009 0,00010 0,00012 h
ineq_ot 0,00028 0,00068 0,00066 0,00065 0,00094 0,00120 0,00197 wave2 -0,0008
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0025 -0,0017
past_ot -0,00012 -0,00017 -0,00013 -0,00011 -0,00017 -0,00009 -0,00001 wave4 -0,0031 -0,0022 -0,0005
ineq 0,00018 0,00040 0,00048 0,00042 0,00059 0,00095 0,00157 wave5 -0,0041 -0,0033 -0,0016 -0,0011
elas -0,00007 -0,00008 0,00007 0,00014 0,00021 0,00026 0,00038 wave6 -0,0056 -0,0048 -0,0031 -0,0025 -0,0015
past -0,00010 -0,00013 -0,00008 -0,00004 -0,00009 0,00001 0,00010 wave7 -0,0065 -0,0056 -0,0039 -0,0034 -0,0023 -0,0009
wave8 -0,0067 -0,0059 -0,0042 -0,0036 -0,0026 -0,0011 -0,0002
y
wave2 -275
wave3 -305 -30
wave4 265 540 570
wave5 572 847 877 307
wave6 884 1159 1189 619 312
wave7 1123 1398 1427 858 551 239
wave8 1712 1988 2017 1447 1140 828 590
G
wave2 -0,0439
wave3 -0,0524 -0,0085
wave4 -0,0520 -0,0081 0,0004
wave5 -0,0552 -0,0113 -0,0028 -0,0032
wave6 -0,0461 -0,0022 0,0063 0,0059 0,0091
wave7 -0,0525 -0,0086 -0,0002 -0,0006 0,0027 -0,0065
wave8 -0,0623 -0,0184 -0,0099 -0,0103 -0,0071 -0,0162 -0,0098  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 8: detailed information for Germany 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0088 0,0083 0,0080 0,0080 0,0079 0,0076 0,0086 0,0091 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8439 0,8405 0,8388 0,8374 0,8352 0,8338 0,8327 0,8294 wave2 -0,00046
y 15431 14637 15077 15482 15475 16257 17229 16819 wave3 -0,00082 -0,0004
G 0,2832 0,2697 0,2611 0,2501 0,2506 0,2549 0,2544 0,2525 wave4 -0,0008 -0,0004 0,0000
N 7520 7520 7520 7520 7520 7520 7520 7520 wave5 -0,0009 -0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0001
CIt-CI1 -0,00046 -0,00082 -0,00083 -0,00090 -0,00119 -0,00020 0,00029 wave6 -0,0012 -0,0007 -0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0003
ineq_in -0,00030 -0,00062 -0,00100 -0,00101 -0,00099 -0,00108 -0,00113 wave7 -0,0002 0,0003 0,0006 0,0006 0,0007 0,0010
elas_in -0,00011 -0,00005 0,00001 0,00001 0,00009 0,00018 0,00015 wave8 0,0003 0,0007 0,0011 0,0011 0,0012 0,0015 0,0005
past_in 0,00002 0,00005 0,00007 0,00009 0,00012 0,00014 0,00017 h
ineq_ot -0,00007 -0,00024 0,00005 0,00001 -0,00041 0,00062 0,00122 wave2 -0,0035
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0051 -0,0016
past_ot -0,00001 0,00004 0,00004 0,00000 -0,00001 -0,00006 -0,00012 wave4 -0,0065 -0,0030 -0,0014
ineq -0,00037 -0,00086 -0,00095 -0,00099 -0,00140 -0,00046 0,00009 wave5 -0,0087 -0,0052 -0,0036 -0,0022
elas -0,00011 -0,00005 0,00001 0,00001 0,00009 0,00018 0,00014 wave6 -0,0101 -0,0067 -0,0050 -0,0036 -0,0014
past 0,00002 0,00009 0,00011 0,00009 0,00011 0,00009 0,00005 wave7 -0,0112 -0,0077 -0,0061 -0,0047 -0,0025 -0,0011
wave8 -0,0145 -0,0110 -0,0094 -0,0080 -0,0058 -0,0044 -0,0033
y
wave2 -794
wave3 -354 440
wave4 51 845 405
wave5 44 838 398 -7
wave6 826 1620 1180 775 782
wave7 1797 2591 2152 1746 1753 971
wave8 1388 2182 1742 1337 1344 562 -409
G
wave2 -0,0134
wave3 -0,0220 -0,0086
wave4 -0,0331 -0,0197 -0,0111
wave5 -0,0326 -0,0191 -0,0105 0,0005
wave6 -0,0283 -0,0148 -0,0062 0,0048 0,0043
wave7 -0,0288 -0,0154 -0,0068 0,0043 0,0038 -0,0005
wave8 -0,0307 -0,0173 -0,0087 0,0024 0,0019 -0,0024 -0,0019  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 9: detailed information for Greece 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0140 0,0145 0,0133 0,0156 0,0163 0,0160 0,0159 0,0166 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9092 0,9078 0,9057 0,9037 0,9023 0,9012 0,8989 0,8962 wave2 0,00056
y 6817 7102 7322 7585 8061 8691 8752 8426 wave3 -0,00069 -0,00124
G 0,3723 0,3537 0,3455 0,3548 0,3544 0,3504 0,3387 0,3337 wave4 0,00168 0,00112 0,00236
N 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 6134 wave5 0,00229 0,00173 0,00298 0,00061
CIt-CI1 0,00056 -0,00069 0,00168 0,00229 0,00206 0,00197 0,00266 wave6 0,00206 0,00150 0,00275 0,00039 -0,00023
ineq_in -0,00019 -0,00024 0,00000 0,00004 0,00006 -0,00002 -0,00024 wave7 0,00197 0,00141 0,00266 0,00029 -0,00032 -0,00009
elas_in 0,00010 0,00016 0,00023 0,00029 0,00027 0,00026 0,00030 wave8 0,00266 0,00211 0,00335 0,00099 0,00037 0,00060 0,00069
past_in 0,00002 0,00004 0,00007 0,00009 0,00011 0,00013 0,00015 h
ineq_ot 0,00061 -0,00065 0,00130 0,00175 0,00149 0,00123 0,00214 wave2 -0,00136
elas_ot -0,00001 -0,00001 -0,00001 -0,00002 -0,00003 -0,00003 -0,00003 wave3 -0,00347 -0,00210
past_ot 0,00002 0,00001 0,00010 0,00015 0,00017 0,00039 0,00034 wave4 -0,00545 -0,00409 -0,00199
ineq 0,0004 -0,0009 0,0013 0,0018 0,0015 0,0012 0,0019 wave5 -0,00690 -0,00554 -0,00343 -0,00144
elas 0,0001 0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 wave6 -0,00793 -0,00657 -0,00447 -0,00248 -0,00103
past 0,0000 0,0001 0,0002 0,0002 0,0003 0,0005 0,0005 wave7 -0,01024 -0,00888 -0,00677 -0,00478 -0,00334 -0,00231
wave8 -0,01291 -0,01155 -0,00944 -0,00745 -0,00601 -0,00498 -0,00267
y
wave2 285
wave3 505 220
wave4 768 483 263
wave5 1244 959 739 476
wave6 1874 1589 1369 1106 630
wave7 1935 1650 1430 1167 691 61
wave8 1609 1323 1104 841 365 -265 -326
G
wave2 -0,01855
wave3 -0,02684 -0,00829
wave4 -0,01747 0,00108 0,00937
wave5 -0,01785 0,00070 0,00899 -0,00038
wave6 -0,02191 -0,00336 0,00492 -0,00445 -0,00406
wave7 -0,03360 -0,01505 -0,00677 -0,01613 -0,01575 -0,01169
wave8 -0,03861 -0,02006 -0,01178 -0,02115 -0,02076 -0,01670 -0,00501  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 10: detailed information for Ireland 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0073 0,0075 0,0079 0,0082 0,0087 0,0092 0,0096 0,0099 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9263 0,9262 0,9251 0,9260 0,9251 0,9246 0,9242 0,9246 wave2 0,0002
y 10089 10712 10526 11450 11384 11882 11873 12509 wave3 0,0006 0,0004
G 0,3168 0,3258 0,3269 0,3179 0,3150 0,3296 0,3149 0,3101 wave4 0,0008 0,0007 0,0002
N 2872 2872 2872 2872 2872 2872 2872 2872 wave5 0,0014 0,0012 0,0008 0,0006
CIt-CI1 0,00016 0,00061 0,00084 0,00139 0,00184 0,00231 0,00252 wave6 0,0018 0,0017 0,0012 0,0010 0,0004
ineq_in -0,00003 -0,00007 -0,00015 -0,00010 -0,00001 0,00013 0,00017 wave7 0,0023 0,0021 0,0017 0,0015 0,0009 0,0005
elas_in 0,00000 0,00001 -0,00002 -0,00002 -0,00006 -0,00006 -0,00012 wave8 0,0025 0,0024 0,0019 0,0017 0,0011 0,0007 0,0002
past_in 0,00001 0,00001 0,00002 0,00003 0,00003 0,00004 0,00004 h
ineq_ot 0,00020 0,00070 0,00096 0,00145 0,00196 0,00228 0,00254 wave2 -0,0001
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0012 -0,0012
past_ot -0,00001 -0,00004 0,00003 0,00003 -0,00008 -0,00008 -0,00010 wave4 -0,0003 -0,0002 0,0009
ineq 0,00016 0,00063 0,00081 0,00135 0,00194 0,00241 0,00271 wave5 -0,0012 -0,0012 0,0000 -0,0009
elas 0,00000 0,00001 -0,00003 -0,00002 -0,00006 -0,00006 -0,00013 wave6 -0,0017 -0,0017 -0,0005 -0,0014 -0,0005
past 0,00000 -0,00002 0,00005 0,00006 -0,00005 -0,00004 -0,00006 wave7 -0,0021 -0,0020 -0,0009 -0,0018 -0,0009 -0,0004
wave8 -0,0017 -0,0016 -0,0005 -0,0014 -0,0005 0,0000 0,0004
y
wave2 622
wave3 437 -186
wave4 1361 738 924
wave5 1294 672 858 -66
wave6 1793 1170 1356 432 498
wave7 1784 1161 1347 423 490 -9
wave8 2419 1797 1983 1059 1125 627 636
G
wave2 0,0090
wave3 0,0101 0,0011
wave4 0,0011 -0,0079 -0,0090
wave5 -0,0017 -0,0108 -0,0119 -0,0029
wave6 0,0128 0,0038 0,0027 0,0117 0,0146
wave7 -0,0019 -0,0109 -0,0120 -0,0030 -0,0001 -0,0147
wave8 -0,0067 -0,0157 -0,0168 -0,0078 -0,0049 -0,0195 -0,0048  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 11: detailed information for Italy 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0053 0,0061 0,0056 0,0058 0,0066 0,0064 0,0064 0,0076 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8791 0,8770 0,8751 0,8729 0,8717 0,8702 0,8675 0,8646 wave2 0,00080
y 10020 10174 10461 10336 11152 11873 11832 11534 wave3 0,00027 -0,00053
G 0,3331 0,3342 0,3264 0,3093 0,3072 0,3068 0,2933 0,2936 wave4 0,00049 -0,00031 0,00022
N 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 wave5 0,00127 0,00047 0,00100 0,00078
CIt-CI1 0,00080 0,00027 0,00049 0,00127 0,00111 0,00115 0,00228 wave6 0,00111 0,00031 0,00084 0,00062 -0,00016
ineq_in -0,00006 -0,00019 -0,00025 -0,00043 -0,00050 -0,00068 -0,00068 wave7 0,00115 0,00035 0,00088 0,00066 -0,00012 0,00004
elas_in 0,00005 0,00013 0,00010 0,00033 0,00050 0,00050 0,00043 wave8 0,00228 0,00148 0,00201 0,00179 0,00101 0,00117 0,00113
past_in 0,00002 0,00003 0,00005 0,00006 0,00008 0,00010 0,00012 h
ineq_ot 0,00086 0,00042 0,00085 0,00147 0,00120 0,00146 0,00261 wave2 -0,00207
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,00401 -0,00194
past_ot -0,00006 -0,00013 -0,00025 -0,00016 -0,00018 -0,00023 -0,00020 wave4 -0,00622 -0,00415 -0,00221
ineq 0,00080 0,00023 0,00059 0,00104 0,00071 0,00078 0,00193 wave5 -0,00738 -0,00531 -0,00337 -0,00116
elas 0,00005 0,00013 0,00010 0,00033 0,00051 0,00050 0,00043 wave6 -0,00891 -0,00684 -0,00490 -0,00269 -0,00153
past -0,00005 -0,00009 -0,00020 -0,00010 -0,00010 -0,00013 -0,00009 wave7 -0,01161 -0,00954 -0,00760 -0,00539 -0,00423 -0,00270
wave8 -0,01449 -0,01242 -0,01048 -0,00827 -0,00711 -0,00558 -0,00288
y
wave2 154
wave3 442 288
wave4 317 162 -125
wave5 1132 978 690 815
wave6 1854 1699 1412 1537 721
wave7 1812 1658 1371 1496 680 -41
wave8 1514 1360 1072 1198 382 -339 -298
G
wave2 0,00106
wave3 -0,00673 -0,00779
wave4 -0,02385 -0,02490 -0,01712
wave5 -0,02591 -0,02697 -0,01918 -0,00207
wave6 -0,02634 -0,02740 -0,01961 -0,00249 -0,00043
wave7 -0,03978 -0,04084 -0,03305 -0,01593 -0,01387 -0,01344
wave8 -0,03948 -0,04054 -0,03275 -0,01563 -0,01357 -0,01314 0,00030  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 12: detailed information for the Netherlands 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0041 0,0036 0,0040 0,0038 0,0039 0,0045 0,0039 0,0043 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,9056 0,9044 0,9039 0,9040 0,9034 0,9027 0,9015 0,9008 wave2 -0,0005
y 13000 13209 13730 14419 14808 15157 14617 15081 wave3 -0,0002 0,0003
G 0,2550 0,2819 0,2890 0,2491 0,2466 0,2487 0,2293 0,2399 wave4 -0,0003 0,0002 -0,0001
N 4556 4556 4556 4556 4556 4556 4556 4556 wave5 -0,0002 0,0003 0,0000 0,0001
CIt-CI1 -0,00052 -0,00019 -0,00031 -0,00023 0,00035 -0,00023 0,00016 wave6 0,0003 0,0009 0,0005 0,0007 0,0006
ineq_in -0,00004 0,00004 -0,00028 -0,00029 -0,00030 -0,00041 -0,00033 wave7 -0,0002 0,0003 0,0000 0,0001 0,0000 -0,0006
elas_in 0,00003 0,00010 0,00018 0,00023 0,00027 0,00021 0,00026 wave8 0,0002 0,0007 0,0004 0,0005 0,0004 -0,0002 0,0004
past_in 0,00000 0,00001 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 0,00002 0,00003 h
ineq_ot -0,00043 -0,00020 -0,00003 0,00003 0,00061 0,00016 0,00039 wave2 -0,0011
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0017 -0,0005
past_ot -0,00009 -0,00014 -0,00019 -0,00021 -0,00024 -0,00022 -0,00018 wave4 -0,0016 -0,0004 0,0001
ineq -0,00046 -0,00016 -0,00031 -0,00027 0,00030 -0,00024 0,00006 wave5 -0,0022 -0,0010 -0,0005 -0,0006
elas 0,00003 0,00010 0,00018 0,00023 0,00026 0,00021 0,00026 wave6 -0,0029 -0,0017 -0,0012 -0,0013 -0,0007
past -0,00009 -0,00013 -0,00018 -0,00020 -0,00022 -0,00019 -0,00015 wave7 -0,0041 -0,0029 -0,0024 -0,0025 -0,0019 -0,0012
wave8 -0,0047 -0,0036 -0,0031 -0,0032 -0,0026 -0,0019 -0,0007
y
wave2 209
wave3 731 522
wave4 1419 1210 689
wave5 1808 1600 1078 389
wave6 2157 1948 1426 738 348
wave7 1618 1409 887 199 -191 -539
wave8 2082 1873 1351 663 273 -75 464
G
wave2 0,0270
wave3 0,0341 0,0071
wave4 -0,0059 -0,0329 -0,0400
wave5 -0,0084 -0,0354 -0,0425 -0,0025
wave6 -0,0063 -0,0333 -0,0404 -0,0004 0,0021
wave7 -0,0256 -0,0526 -0,0597 -0,0197 -0,0173 -0,0194
wave8 -0,0150 -0,0420 -0,0491 -0,0091 -0,0067 -0,0088 0,0106  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 13: detailed information for Portugal 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0201 0,0197 0,0199 0,0207 0,0215 0,0223 0,0229 0,0237 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8370 0,8345 0,8328 0,8306 0,8291 0,8281 0,8264 0,8245 wave2 -0,0004
y 7183 7210 7554 7773 8242 8654 9088 9527 wave3 -0,0002 0,0002
G 0,3669 0,3556 0,3502 0,3498 0,3575 0,3506 0,3534 0,3602 wave4 0,0006 0,0010 0,0008
N 7097 7097 7097 7097 7097 7097 7097 7097 wave5 0,0014 0,0019 0,0016 0,0008
CIt-CI1 -0,00045 -0,00022 0,00058 0,00143 0,00220 0,00282 0,00355 wave6 0,0022 0,0026 0,0024 0,0016 0,0008
ineq_in -0,00035 -0,00067 -0,00074 -0,00064 -0,00087 -0,00081 -0,00093 wave7 0,0028 0,0033 0,0030 0,0022 0,0014 0,0006
elas_in 0,00002 0,00030 0,00047 0,00079 0,00104 0,00127 0,00146 wave8 0,0036 0,0040 0,0038 0,0030 0,0021 0,0014 0,0007
past_in 0,00005 0,00010 0,00015 0,00020 0,00024 0,00030 0,00035 h
ineq_ot -0,00019 -0,00006 0,00068 0,00103 0,00190 0,00203 0,00249 wave2 -0,0025
elas_ot 0,00000 -0,00001 -0,00002 -0,00003 -0,00004 -0,00006 -0,00007 wave3 -0,0042 -0,0017
past_ot 0,00003 0,00012 0,00004 0,00008 -0,00006 0,00009 0,00026 wave4 -0,0064 -0,0039 -0,0022
ineq -0,00055 -0,00073 -0,00006 0,00039 0,00102 0,00122 0,00156 wave5 -0,0079 -0,0054 -0,0037 -0,0015
elas 0,00002 0,00029 0,00045 0,00076 0,00099 0,00121 0,00139 wave6 -0,0089 -0,0064 -0,0047 -0,0026 -0,0011
past 0,00008 0,00022 0,00019 0,00028 0,00018 0,00039 0,00060 wave7 -0,0106 -0,0081 -0,0064 -0,0043 -0,0028 -0,0017
wave8 -0,0125 -0,0100 -0,0083 -0,0062 -0,0047 -0,0036 -0,0019
y
wave2 27
wave3 371 344
wave4 590 563 219
wave5 1059 1032 688 469
wave6 1471 1444 1100 881 412
wave7 1905 1879 1534 1316 846 435
wave8 2344 2317 1973 1754 1285 873 439
G
wave2 -0,0113
wave3 -0,0166 -0,0053
wave4 -0,0170 -0,0058 -0,0004
wave5 -0,0093 0,0019 0,0073 0,0077
wave6 -0,0162 -0,0049 0,0004 0,0008 -0,0069
wave7 -0,0135 -0,0022 0,0031 0,0036 -0,0042 0,0027
wave8 -0,0067 0,0046 0,0100 0,0104 0,0027 0,0096 0,0068  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
Appendix Table 14: detailed information for Spain 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0094 0,0096 0,0094 0,0097 0,0100 0,0111 0,0122 0,0127 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8829 0,8816 0,8803 0,8782 0,8769 0,8772 0,8760 0,8752 wave2 0,00013
y 8911 9090 9477 9467 9552 10449 10918 11483 wave3 -0,00006 -0,00019
G 0,3380 0,3223 0,3304 0,3346 0,3244 0,3179 0,3151 0,3176 wave4 0,00027 0,00014 0,00033
N 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 7307 wave5 0,00056 0,00044 0,00062 0,00029
CIt-CI1 0,00013 -0,00006 0,00027 0,00056 0,00167 0,00276 0,00330 wave6 0,00167 0,00154 0,00173 0,00140 0,00111
ineq_in -0,00027 -0,00037 -0,00012 -0,00027 -0,00044 -0,00065 -0,00062 wave7 0,00276 0,00263 0,00282 0,00249 0,00220 0,00109
elas_in 0,00007 0,00022 0,00022 0,00025 0,00054 0,00067 0,00081 wave8 0,00330 0,00317 0,00336 0,00303 0,00274 0,00163 0,00054
past_in 0,00002 0,00004 0,00006 0,00007 0,00009 0,00011 0,00013 h
ineq_ot 0,00035 0,00014 0,00012 0,00050 0,00164 0,00274 0,00314 wave2 -0,00132
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 -0,00001 -0,00001 wave3 -0,00267 -0,00135
past_ot -0,00004 -0,00009 0,00000 0,00001 -0,00015 -0,00010 -0,00015 wave4 -0,00470 -0,00338 -0,00204
ineq 0,00008 -0,00023 0,00000 0,00023 0,00119 0,00209 0,00252 wave5 -0,00604 -0,00472 -0,00337 -0,00134
elas 0,00007 0,00022 0,00021 0,00025 0,00054 0,00067 0,00080 wave6 -0,00577 -0,00445 -0,00311 -0,00107 0,00027
past -0,00002 -0,00005 0,00006 0,00008 -0,00006 0,00000 -0,00002 wave7 -0,00698 -0,00565 -0,00431 -0,00227 -0,00093 -0,00120
wave8 -0,00778 -0,00646 -0,00511 -0,00308 -0,00174 -0,00201 -0,00080
y
wave2 179
wave3 566 387
wave4 555 376 -11
wave5 640 461 74 85
wave6 1538 1359 972 982 897
wave7 2006 1827 1440 1451 1366 468
wave8 2572 2393 2006 2017 1932 1034 566
G
wave2 -0,01579
wave3 -0,00768 0,00811
wave4 -0,00345 0,01234 0,00422
wave5 -0,01369 0,00210 -0,00601 -0,01024
wave6 -0,02018 -0,00439 -0,01251 -0,01673 -0,00650
wave7 -0,02291 -0,00712 -0,01523 -0,01946 -0,00922 -0,00273
wave8 -0,02041 -0,00462 -0,01273 -0,01696 -0,00672 -0,00023 0,00250  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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Appendix Table 15: detailed information for UK 
wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7 wave8 PAIRWISE TESTS ON DIFFERENCE
CI 0,0091 0,0096 0,0097 0,0098 0,0106 0,0101 0,0104 0,0111 CI wave1 wave2 wave3 wave4 wave5 wave6 wave7
h 0,8860 0,8848 0,8851 0,8858 0,8859 0,8848 0,8856 0,8859 wave2 0,0005
y 13625 13767 14057 14781 15450 15319 16183 16652 wave3 0,0006 0,0001
G 0,3004 0,3176 0,3011 0,2909 0,3068 0,3088 0,3071 0,3014 wave4 0,0007 0,0002 0,0002
N 5925 5925 5925 5925 5925 5925 5925 5925 wave5 0,0015 0,0010 0,0010 0,0008
CIt-CI1 0,00050 0,00057 0,00074 0,00155 0,00106 0,00135 0,00199 wave6 0,0011 0,0006 0,0005 0,0003 -0,0005
ineq_in -0,00015 -0,00025 -0,00060 -0,00033 -0,00051 -0,00063 -0,00059 wave7 0,0013 0,0008 0,0008 0,0006 -0,0002 0,0003
elas_in 0,00004 0,00013 0,00033 0,00049 0,00046 0,00065 0,00075 wave8 0,0020 0,0015 0,0014 0,0013 0,0004 0,0009 0,0006
past_in 0,00001 0,00002 0,00002 0,00003 0,00004 0,00004 0,00005 h
ineq_ot 0,00056 0,00060 0,00090 0,00126 0,00095 0,00116 0,00168 wave2 -0,0012
elas_ot 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 wave3 -0,0009 0,0003
past_ot 0,00005 0,00008 0,00010 0,00010 0,00012 0,00013 0,00011 wave4 -0,0002 0,0009 0,0006
ineq 0,00041 0,00035 0,00029 0,00093 0,00044 0,00053 0,00109 wave5 -0,0001 0,0011 0,0008 0,0001
elas 0,00004 0,00013 0,00033 0,00049 0,00046 0,00065 0,00074 wave6 -0,0012 0,0000 -0,0003 -0,0010 -0,0011
past 0,00005 0,00010 0,00012 0,00013 0,00016 0,00017 0,00016 wave7 -0,0004 0,0007 0,0004 -0,0002 -0,0003 0,0007
wave8 -0,0001 0,0010 0,0007 0,0001 0,0000 0,0011 0,0003
y
wave2 142
wave3 433 291
wave4 1156 1014 723
wave5 1825 1683 1392 669
wave6 1694 1552 1261 538 -131
wave7 2559 2417 2126 1403 734 865
wave8 3028 2885 2595 1872 1203 1334 469
G
wave2 0,0172
wave3 0,0007 -0,0165
wave4 -0,0095 -0,0267 -0,0102
wave5 0,0064 -0,0108 0,0057 0,0159
wave6 0,0083 -0,0088 0,0077 0,0179 0,0020
wave7 0,0067 -0,0105 0,0060 0,0162 0,0003 -0,0017
wave8 0,0010 -0,0162 0,0003 0,0105 -0,0054 -0,0074 -0,0057  
Note: CI= ( )it itC h y ; h= tH ; y= tY ; G= ( )itG y ; CIt-CI1= ( ) ( )1 1it it i iC h y C h y− ; ineq_in: equation (2.20); elas_in: equation (2.14); 
past_in: equation (2.24); ineq_ot: equation (2.21); elas_ot: equation (2.15); past_ot: equation (2.25); ineq: sum of all ineq_-terms; elas: 
sum of all elas_-terms; past: sum of all past_-terms; shaded: statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
